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“I’ve been betting on it for years . . . . This farm here has been set up 
for the future.”
1
  INTRODUCTION   
 
What if for every person or business harmed by the effects 
of climate change in the next one hundred years, another per-
son or business is benefited by the effects of climate change in 
equal magnitude? Although an unlikely scenario, it calls atten-
tion to the fact that many people and businesses in the United 
States will receive market and nonmarket benefits from cli-
mate change, and some may even conclude they are better off—
that they are climate change “winners.” One may ask how there 
can be any winners given how disastrous climate change could 
be for the global population. But that is the point—even accept-
ing that climate change presents a significant net loss for the 
global population, it is not necessarily a net loss for everyone. 
Whether you are a climate change winner or loser depends on 
your perceptions and circumstances. 
The biophysical effects of climate change will be uneven 
around the globe and within the United States.2
 
 1. Michael Hill, Surf’s Up, Buffalo: The Good Side of Global Warming, 
USA TODAY, June 17, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/ 
climate/globalwarming/2007-06-14-warming-winners_N.htm. Chris Loken, a 
Hudson Valley apple grower, uttered this response when asked why he diver-
sified his farm to include peach, apricot, and plum trees, crops not usually as-
sociated with frosty Upstate New York. Id. The “it,” of course, is climate 
change—the 75-year-old Mr. Loken is counting on milder weather. Id.  
 Some impacts 
 2. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT passim (2007) [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS 
REPORT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ 
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will open up opportunities for people and businesses to secure 
benefits in some areas, such as by increased rainfall, longer 
growing seasons, and more temperate weather.3 Some impacts 
will open up highly profitable business opportunities in some 
areas, such as building seawalls or outfitting warm weather 
outdoor recreation.4 Hence, although it most likely is the case 
that at global scales the net aggregate economic impacts of cli-
mate change will be negative over time,5
Indeed, many people and businesses will receive benefits of 
significant magnitude, enough to lead them to conclude they 
are better off because of climate change. Their attitudes about 
climate policy could be influenced by their perception that “life 
is good” thanks to climate change. Their behaviors with poten-
tial climate impacts, such as energy use and product consump-
tions choices, could also be shaped by their climate change 
winner profiles. Thus, whereas legal scholars have extensively 
explored how to protect climate change losers, this Article is the 
 at local scales there 
will be significant variation in impact profiles.  
 
ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE 
RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/ 
climate-impacts-report.pdf.  
 3. See, e.g., IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69 (“For increases 
in global average temperature of less than 1 to 3°C above 1980–1999 levels, 
some impacts are projected to produce market benefits in some places and sec-
tors while, at the same time, imposing costs in other places and sectors.”); U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT GLOBAL 
WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE: BACK TO BASICS, 6–7 (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/Climate_Basics 
.pdf (acknowledging “a warming climate will have both positive and negative 
impacts” and mentioning benefits to some crops, improved water availability, 
lower heating bills, and outdoor recreation as examples); U.S. GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 30 (increased precipitation), 65 
(decreased severe cold), 88 (recreational benefits of warmer weather), 139 
(longer frost-free periods), 140 (longer growing seasons). See generally infra 
Part I. 
 4. See FRANCES G. SUSSMAN & J. RANDALL FREED, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A BUSINESS APPROACH 2–
4 (2008) (discussing various business opportunities resulting from climate 
change).  
 5. See DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, U.S. MARKET CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, at v 
(2004) (“Once temperature and other key climate parameters reach certain 
thresholds . . . benefits peak and begin to decline—eventually becoming dam-
ages.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 99 
(“[W]hile there are likely to be some benefits and opportunities in the early 
stages of warming, as climate continues to change, negative impacts are pro-
jected to dominate.”). 
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first in legal scholarship to ask what to do about the prospect of 
many people and businesses believing they are climate change 
winners. 
Talk of climate change benefits goes against the grain of 
prevailing climate policy dialogue. It is not for polite “green” 
conversation. It certainly has not been the subject of legal 
scholarship. True, some economists, not uncontroversially, have 
developed integrated assessment model (IAM)6 projections 
showing the United States faring relatively well under plausi-
ble climate change scenarios compared to other nations and, 
from this, have argued that this national “winner” outcome mil-
itates against pursuing aggressive domestic greenhouse gas 
emission regulation policies.7 In more focused econometric re-
search, a number of detailed studies have also suggested the 
potential for gains in the agriculture sector.8
 
 6. IAM is “insider lingo for a multiple-equation computer-simulated 
model that combines dynamic economics with geophysical climate dynamics 
for the purposes of analyzing the economic effects of global climate change. An 
IAM is essentially a model of economic growth with a controllable externality 
of endogenous greenhouse warming.” Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of the 
Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
703, 705 (2007) [hereinafter Weitzman, A Review of the Stern Review]. See 
generally Hadi Dowlatabadi, Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change: 
An Incomplete Overview, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 289 (1995) (providing a broad over-
view of IAM methods and policy uses); William D. Nordhaus, Integrated Eco-
nomic and Climate Modeling (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1839, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970295 (surveying current IAM 
techniques). 
 But most scientific 
and policy analyses of climate change impacts, especially offi-
cial ones, pay little attention to the climate change impacts 
 7. Compare Robert O. Mendelsohn, A Critique of the Stern Report, REG-
ULATION, Winter 2006–2007, at 42, 42 (“[E]conomists have long argued that 
stabilizing greenhouse gases at 550 ppm is not efficient because the costs far 
outweigh the benefits.”), with Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate 
Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (2009) (describing and 
challenging this position). The economist William Nordhaus started this de-
bate with his classic paper on “going slow” with greenhouse gas regulation. See 
William D. Nordhaus, To Slow or Not to Slow: The Economics of the Green-
house Effect, 101 ECON. J. 920 (1991).  
 8. See, e.g., Oliver Deschênes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Im-
pacts of Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random 
Fluctuations in Weather, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 354 (2007); Günther Fischer et 
al., Socio-Economic and Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture: An Integrat-
ed Assessment, 1990–2080, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 2067, 
2074 (2005); Cynthia Rosenzwelg & Martin L. Parry, Potential Impact of Cli-
mate Change on World Food Supply, 367 NATURE 133, 133 (1994) (noting that 
crop declines are only small to moderate); I. Supit et al., Recent Changes in the 
Climatic Yield Potential of Various Crops in Europe, 103 AGRIC. SYS. 683, 688 
(2010). 
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that will produce market and nonmarket benefits, begrudgingly 
acknowledging them in the most general of terms and then in-
variably qualifying with discussion of adverse impacts.9 In par-
ticular, within-country distributions of costs and benefits of 
climate change are poorly understood,10 the benefits side of the 
ledger has been only superficially studied,11 and how to take 
advantage of any benefits is virtually never discussed.12
 
 9. See, e.g., CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, 2009 CALIFORNIA CLIMATE AD-
APTATION STRATEGY: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA IN RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE ORDER S-13-2008, at 94 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CNRA-1000-2009-027/ 
CNRA-1000-2009-027-F.PDF (“[T]he production of high-quality wine grapes is 
expected to benefit from a warmer climate because of a longer growing season 
and more favorable growing conditions in the short-term. At some point, how-
ever, the magnitude of the warming may become too large for certain grape 
varieties.”); IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 
 Conse-
2, at 48 (“Overall it is ex-
pected that benefits will be outweighed by the negative health effects of rising 
temperatures.”), 49 (“The negative impacts of climate change on freshwater 
systems outweigh its benefits . . . impacts of increased annual runoff in some 
areas are likely to be tempered by negative effects of increased precipitation 
variability and seasonal runoff shifts on water supply, water quality and flood 
risk.”); THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. 
AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION REPORT 15 (2011), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/cca/eea-climate-adaptation-
report.pdf (“While a longer growing season due to increased temperatures may 
support new crops and fruits, agricultural activities could experience com-
pounded impacts due to changes in precipitation and runoff, and increasing 
weed and pest problems.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra 
note 2, at 12 (“Many crops show positive responses to elevated carbon dioxide 
and low levels of warming, but higher levels of warming often negatively affect 
growth and yields.”), 30 (“[P]otential water resource benefits from increasing 
precipitation could be countered by the competing influences of increasing 
evaporation and runoff.”). 
 10. See Robert Mendelsohn et al., The Distributional Impact of Climate 
Change on Rich and Poor Countries, 11 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 159, 174 (2006) 
(conducting a broad study of relative effects at national scales, but acknowl-
edging that “many countries are large enough so that different regions will 
have different effects within national borders”).  
 11. See Jason Scott Johnston, A Looming Policy Disaster, REGULATION, 
Fall 2008, at 38, 39 (complaining that official impact assessments are “not at 
all keen on identifying benefits from global warming”). Economist Robert 
Mendelsohn claims that “as economic research on impacts has improved, the 
magnitude of projected damages from climate change has fallen,” one reason 
being “that the early studies . . . did not always take into account some of the 
benefits of warming to agriculture, timber, and tourism.” Robert Mendelsohn, 
Climate Change and Economic Growth 10–11 (Comm’n on Growth & Dev., 
Working Paper No. 60, 2009), available at http://environment.yale.edu/files/ 
biblio/YaleFES-00000397.pdf. 
 12. For example, a recent federal government report on climate change 
adaptation policy fails to mention that there will be any benefits from climate 
change, and thus necessarily fails to discuss how adaptation policy could help 
harness them. INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE, 
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quently, although most analysts agree some areas of the world 
will be hit harder than others,13 the probability that millions of 
people and thousands of businesses and communities within 
particular nations such as the United States will actually re-
ceive significant market and nonmarket benefits from climate 
change is rarely mentioned in official statements as something 
climate policy should take into account.14
 
FEDERAL ACTIONS FOR A CLIMATE RESILIENT NATION 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/2011_adaptation_
progress_report.pdf. Similarly, state and local adaptation analyses and plans 
developed to date are devoid of any discussion of benefit-securing adaptation 
measures. See, e.g., CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, supra note 
  
9, passim; 
CHICAGO CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2011), available at http://www 
.chicagoclimateaction.org/filebin/pdf/finalreport/CCAPREPORTFINALv2.pdf; 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, 
supra note 9, passim; MD. COMM’N ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE ACTION 
PLAN (2008), available at http://www.mdclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/ 
O40F14798.pdf; WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PREPARING FOR CHANGING 
CLIMATE: WASHINGTON STATE’S INTEGRATED CLIMATE RESPONSE STRATEGY 
(2012), available at www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/ipa_responsestrategy.htm. 
A recent business adaptation strategy report by the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change mentions several opportunities climate change presents for 
businesses but does not discuss any of these in the larger discussion of busi-
ness adaptation strategies. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 2–4, 7–10. 
One exception to this pattern comes from Scotland, where the national adap-
tation strategy includes ample references to climate change benefits the nation 
might enjoy and includes them, albeit with little detail, within the scope of the 
adaptation strategy. See THE SCOTTISH GOV’T, SCOTLAND’S CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION FRAMEWORK 9 (2009), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/ 
Resource/Doc/295110/0091310.pdf (discussing benefits like increased outdoor 
recreation opportunities and fewer deaths because of cold). I have been unable 
to locate any public, private, or nonprofit-sector analyses of how to design and 
implement adaptation strategies for securing climate change benefits in the 
United States. 
 13. A number of the national scale IAM studies show North America, 
Russia, and Eastern Europe as best off under a range of climate change sce-
narios, with small to substantial increases in GDP, and Africa, parts of Asia, 
and small island states as worst off. See RICHARD S.J. TOL, AN ANALYSIS OF 
MITIGATION AS A RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 6, 10 (2009) (chart based on 
synthesis of a dozen IAM studies); Asbjørn Aaheim et al., Impacts and Adapta-
tion to Climate Change in European Economies, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 
959, 964–67 (2012) (concluding that Eastern European nations will see a rise 
in GDP under a scenario of a global mean temperature rise of 2°C); Robert 
Mendelsohn et al., Country-Specific Market Impacts of Climate Change, 45 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 553, 561–65 (2000) (“Given these regional results, it is no 
surprise that the impacts of global warming are not felt uniformly across 
countries.”). 
 14. See Karen L. O’Brien & Robin M. Leichenko, Winners and Losers in 
the Context of Global Change, 93 ANNALS OF ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 89, 89 
(2003) [hereinafter O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers] (“In the case of 
global climate change, policy-makers are often reluctant to identify or 
acknowledge winners and losers, particularly winners. Many consider such 
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Indeed, only a handful of legal scholars weighing in on U.S. 
policy for climate change mitigation (avoiding climate change)15 
and adaptation (coping with climate change)16 so much as men-
tion that there will be climate change benefits of any kind or 
magnitude. Most of those who have examined the topic confine 
the analysis to whether the United States will be an overall 
winner among nations and, if so, what that means for our do-
mestic and international policies.17 Few legal scholars even al-
lude to the possibility that significant streams of climate 
change benefits in different regions and industries of the Unit-
ed States could complicate domestic politics.18
 
discussions to be divisive and detrimental to efforts to develop a global accord 
on climate change abatement.”); see also id. at 97 (“[E]xplicit references to 
winners and losers is largely avoided in official documents.”). There is anecdo-
tal evidence that talk of climate change winners was not merely officially sup-
pressed early in the international climate policy dialogue, but was punished. A 
researcher who obtained international and domestic agency funding for a 1990 
workshop on national climate change winners and losers claims that one fund-
ing agent was subsequently reprimanded and the other fired. M. Glantz, Oh! 
What a Lovely Climate Change: Global Warming’s Winners and Losers, 
FRAGILECOLOGIES (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.fragilecologies.com/?p=692.html. 
  
 15. Climate change “mitigation” refers to “measures to reduce climate 
change by, for example, reducing emissions of heat-trapping gases and parti-
cles, or increasing removal of heat-trapping gases from the atmosphere.” U.S. 
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 8. 
 16. Climate change “adaptation” refers to “measures to improve our abil-
ity to cope with or avoid harmful impacts and take advantage of beneficial 
ones, now and in the future.” Id. at 11.  
 17. See Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay?, 
23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4–37 (2007) (examining theories of which na-
tions should finance adaptation efforts in hard-hit poor countries and rejecting 
the “winners pay” approach); Freeman & Guzman, supra note 7 (challenging 
the argument that the United States is a climate change winner); Symposium, 
Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10695 (2011) (featuring 
a series of responses by economists and environmental law and policy experts 
to Freeman and Guzman’s Climate Change and U.S. Interests); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate 
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1675, 1677 (2008) (discussing the national scale costs and benefits as guiding 
domestic policy); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: 
Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 697–99 (1999) (observ-
ing that climate change impacts will vary across nations and thus complicate 
international solutions); see also Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Con-
fusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22–42 (2008) 
(arguing that the national aggregate of local benefits from climate change un-
dercuts the case that Congress intended the Clean Air Act to regulate green-
house gas emissions). 
 18. See Johnston, supra note 11, at 38–39, 41 (arguing that “the moderat-
ing effect of global warming on wintertime temperatures in the cold northern, 
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But there will be climate change beneficiaries living among 
us at every geopolitical scale.19 Regardless of whether the Unit-
ed States in the aggregate will be a climate change winner 
compared to any other nation, there will be climate change 
benefits flowing to some people and some businesses within 
every region, state, county, city, and neighborhood in our na-
tion. The major construction business building seawalls where 
coastal properties face sea level rise,20 the farmer enjoying 
longer growing seasons21 within sight of mountains with dying 
ski areas,22 and the impoverished family with lower heating 
bills23 living in the same community as other people faced with 
increased flooding24—they and many people and businesses like 
them will all be receiving climate change benefits near people 
and businesses suffering climate change harms. And if enough 
climate change beneficiaries are concentrated in any particular 
region, they may very well influence local and even state politi-
cal units to take their constituents’ benefits into account.25
 
interior, and northeastern regions of the United States will be a decided bene-
fit to people living in such places, worth billions of dollars a year” and predict-
ing that this uneven projected geographic distribution of costs and benefits of 
climate change will complicate achieving agreement on national policy); Rich-
ard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1185 (2009) (“The 
potential for short-term benefits from climate change in nations like the Unit-
ed States will fuel other climate change lawmaking skeptics.”). I have briefly 
raised domestic climate change benefits as a policy issue in several previously 
published articles but have not developed the topic as I set out to do in this 
Article. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural 
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 383–84 (2010).  
 In 
short, people and businesses are likely to begin to attach im-
 19. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 50. 
 20. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that climate change 
might increase the market for “climate proofing materials”). 
 21. See Fisher et al., supra note 8, at 2074. 
 22. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that winter tourism 
will decline due to climate change). 
 23. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7. 
 24. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 41. 
 25. It has been shown, for example, that legislators from jurisdictions 
with high greenhouse gas emissions tend to vote against climate change miti-
gation initiatives that could impose costs on the emission sources. See Michael 
I. Cragg & Matthew E. Kahn, Carbon Geography: The Political Economy of 
Congressional Support for Legislation Intended to Mitigate Greenhouse Gas 
Production (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14,963, 2009), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14963.pdf. There is every reason to 
believe that legislators in jurisdictions receiving substantial climate change 
benefits will be similarly likely to base their climate policy positions on the in-
terests of their constituents.  
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portance to their climate change benefits, enough to lead them 
to behave like climate change winners in the political arena.26 
One need only consider as an example how successful the agri-
culture industry has been at challenging and avoiding envi-
ronmental regulation27
This Article explores what policy steps to take now in an-
ticipation of the growth in the United States of a substantial 
and diverse class of people and businesses believing they are 
climate change winners. My central argument is that climate 
change winners are, on average, likely to place low priority on 
mitigation policy aimed at regulating greenhouse gas emis-
sions, or perhaps even oppose such policy, and high priority on 
adaptation policies that will secure their climate change bene-
fits. Indeed, lest there be any doubt about this potential, there 
is evidence from the popular press that some people and busi-
nesses already are aware of their potential winner status and 
are enjoying thinking about the possibilities. As one prominent 
commentator has summed up: 
 to see how the emergence of a class of 
climate change winners could similarly warp climate policy.  
It may sound odd to ask of global warming, What’s in it for me? But 
the question is neither crass nor tongue-in-cheek. The ways in which 
climate change could skew the world’s distribution of wealth should 
help us appreciate just how profoundly an artificial greenhouse effect 
might shake our lives. Moreover, some of the lasting effects of climate 
change are likely to come not so much from the warming itself but 
from how we react to it: If the world warms appreciably, men and 
women will not sit by idly, eating bonbons and reading weather re-
ports; there will be instead what economists call “adaptive response,” 
most likely a great deal of it. Some aspects of this response may in-
flame tensions between those who are winning and those who are los-
ing. How people, the global economy, and the international power 
structure adapt to climate change may influence how we live for gen-
erations. If the world warms, who will win? Who will lose? And what’s 
in it for you?28
 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
  
 27. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and En-
vironmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000) (reviewing the numerous and 
substantial safe harbors agriculture has secured from environmental regula-
tion). 
 28. Gregg Easterbrook, Global Warming: Who Loses—and Who Wins?, 
THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2007, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2007/04/global-warming-who-loses-and-who-wins/305698 
(discussing broadly the climate change winner issue); see also Olaf Stampf, 
Global Warming: Not the End of the World as We Know It, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
INT’L (Christopher Sultan trans., May 7, 2007), http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/germany/global-warming-not-the-end-of-the-world-as-we-know-
it-a-481684.html (discussing likely climate change winners in Germany). 
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Some respected policy analysis organizations also are be-
ginning to pay attention to opportunities in climate change. 
Particularly telling is a passage from a recent study of business 
and climate change observing that  
for many businesses, at least some of the physical changes associated 
with climate change may present opportunities as well as risks . . . . 
Adaptation may also create new product markets, such as climate 
proofing materials and building designs, or result in market shifts, by 
making locally sourced materials more attractive in order to reduce 
travel miles, for instance.  
  Similar examples can be constructed for many other businesses, 
suggesting that climate change will produce both winners and losers, 
risks and opportunities.29
Going even further, the State of Oregon has observed that 
government economic development policy could take advantage 
of potential opportunities from climate change, in that  
  
[r]esponding to climate change will cause large amounts of capital to 
flow into both low-carbon technology and adaptation technology. Ore-
gon should view this transition as an economic development oppor-
tunity. By choosing to act now, Oregon can create a business envi-
ronment that stimulates and supports both mitigation and adaptation 
technologies. As early adopters, Oregon businesses can earn critical 
early market share. This can drive economic growth in the state and 
will establish a foundation for exporting both products and expertise 
to other states and the rest of the world.30
The message is clear—many people and businesses in the 
United States are going to see a bright side to climate change, 
and some of them are already thinking about it. It seems un-
likely that these and other climate change winners will be lead-
ing the way for aggressive greenhouse gas emissions regula-
tion.
  
31
 
 29. See, e.g., SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 
 Moreover, even if they generally support or are 
indifferent about regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, they 
are likely to be interested in how to direct public policy to reap 
their climate change benefits while available. Clearly, there-
fore, the time to consider how climate change winners factor in-
4, at 3. 
 30. GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., FINAL REPORT TO 
THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 10 
(2008), available at http://cms.oregon.gov/ENERGY/gblwrm/docs/ccigreport08web 
.pdf. Although it is unique among domestic government climate change adap-
tation policy documents in recognizing these climate change benefits, like oth-
er official reports the Oregon study does not delve into details about the scope 
of economic opportunities or how to take advantage of them. 
 31. Cf. J.P. Palutikof et al., Public Perceptions of Unusually Warm Weath-
er in the UK: Impacts, Responses and Adaptations, 26 CLIMATE RES. 43, 58 
(2004) (concluding that people will be unlikely to take steps to mitigate cli-
mate change when they view climate change as personally beneficial). 
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to the climate policy debate is now. That is the objective of this 
Article. 
Part I of the Article opens by framing the premises and 
limitations of the analysis and by developing a typology of cli-
mate change benefits and beneficiaries. Given the inevitable 
emergence and broad distribution of climate change benefits 
and beneficiaries, Part II of the Article uses a framework social 
scientists have developed for thinking about winners and losers 
in global change processes generally to define climate change 
winners as people and businesses who, accurately or not, per-
ceive that their lives and enterprises are better off because of 
the benefits they are receiving or anticipate receiving from cli-
mate change. Part II also explores evidence suggesting that 
people and businesses are likely to know when they receive 
climate change benefits and to self-identify themselves as cli-
mate change winners if the benefits are substantial. Part III 
then frames the interests of climate change winners more con-
cretely in the political economy of climate policy, making the 
case that because people and businesses seeing themselves as 
climate change winners might be sufficiently concentrated to 
exert political influence on local and regional scales, they may 
succeed in influencing the mitigation and adaptation policies of 
many local political units, thus complicating state and national 
political discourse on climate change. 
Using the background developed in Parts I through III, the 
remainder of the Article turns to normative dimensions and 
positive legal responses. Part IV argues that climate change 
mitigation policy should not be influenced by the prospect of a 
large class of climate change winners, arguing that climate 
change policy should focus principally on cost-effective 
measures to stabilize the climate without regard to the impact 
doing so could have on the sub-national distribution of climate 
change benefits. By contrast, Part V argues that climate 
change adaptation policy, in addition to its focus on increasing 
the resilience and reducing the vulnerability of populations 
threatened by climate change, should also make efficient in-
vestments to harness climate change benefits on behalf of cli-
mate change winners.  
There is nothing inconsistent about working to limit cli-
mate change with one hand while working with the other hand 
to secure and deliver the benefits of climate change to those for-
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tunate enough to be able to enjoy them.32
Rather than treating it as taboo, the topic of climate 
change winners should be fully aired in climate policy dialogue. 
Climate change policy has triggered complex and difficult 
tradeoff decisions, even with relatively little thus far in the way 
of climate change impacts.
 I argue in Part VI, 
however, that given the national policy goal of mitigating and 
adapting to climate change, no vested rights in climate change 
benefits should accrue. The two-pronged policy outlined in 
Parts IV and V must be put into place now in order to incorpo-
rate and acculturate a “no vested rights” condition of climate 
change benefits. Part VI thus outlines legal doctrines and tech-
niques that can be employed to support this condition. 
33 These tradeoffs can only become 
more complex and contested as tangible climate change harms 
and benefits begin to take hold across the landscape and 
throughout the economy.34 Climate change benefits, and those 
who believe they are climate change winners, are in our not-
too-distant future.35
I.  A TYPOLOGY OF CLIMATE CHANGE BENEFITS AND 
BENEFICIARIES   
 By the time they do emerge, climate policy 
needs to have already settled what to do about them. The ap-
proach I advocate in this Article is designed to build a climate 
change winners component into the front end of climate policy 
development, so that the benefits of climate change can be 
reaped through adaptation policies without derailing the miti-
gation policies designed to eliminate them.  
Although the dimensions and demographics of the climate 
change winners problem cannot be predicted with any more 
certainty than can other impacts of climate change,36
 
 32. See, e.g., GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., supra 
note 
 there is 
no scenario of climate change in play in official policy dialogue 
that can reasonably be interpreted to rule out the possibility of 
substantial market and nonmarket benefits from climate 
change for people and businesses in many areas. There is simp-
30, at 10 (recommending both mitigating the effects of climate change 
and preparing for economic opportunities from climate change). 
 33. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 12 
(listing early impacts of climate change and noting that impacts “are expected 
to increase”). 
 34. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that the positive effects have not 
been quantified). 
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ly no plausible way to project warming in the climate system 
and not concede there will be many people and businesses ben-
efitting directly and indirectly from the changes taking place at 
the ground level. This part of the Article first demonstrates 
that this reality of direct and indirect streams of climate 
change benefits is inescapable, and then develops a typology of 
the different ways in which people and businesses will receive 
these benefits.  
There are several premises I assume to be true to put these 
arguments in motion. First, I assume that people and business-
es are able, even if in very rough form, to connect climate 
change to changes in their economic circumstances. Second, I 
assume they act primarily out of self-interest. Third, I assume 
that their planning horizons do not extend in any manner 
meaningful to my purposes beyond one or two generations for 
people, and a decade or two at most for businesses and commu-
nities. Fourth, I assume that climate change integrated as-
sessment models (IAMs)37
I concede that any of these premises is subject to debate: 
people may have limited capacity to understand how climate 
change affects them; some people care deeply about and act on 
behalf of people in other countries and ecosystems around the 
globe suffering from climate change; some people care deeply 
about and act on behalf of the environment and people of the 
very deep future; the predictive capacity of climate models 
could improve dramatically beyond present capacities; and 
some new technology might appear that allows far more rapid 
and precise manipulation of climate than we currently believe 
possible.
 cannot accurately predict local flows 
of climate change benefits and harms beyond those planning 
horizons, at best. Fifth, I assume that mitigation techniques 
(e.g., emissions regulation) and technology (e.g., carbon seques-
tration) cannot deliver climate stabilization benefits within 
those planning horizons, and likely not until much later. Sixth, 
I assume that climate change IAMs cannot accurately predict 
when a particular mitigation policy’s package of techniques and 
technologies will stabilize climate or what the new climate re-
gime will be.  
38
 
 37. See supra note 
 Nevertheless, my premises seem reasonably secure 
6. 
 38. If people cannot perceive the risks of climate change, support for miti-
gation would likely fall. See Sammy Zahran et al., Climate Change Vulnerabil-
ity and Policy Support, 19 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES: AN INT’L J. 771, 781 
(2006) (showing that individuals who perceive climate change as harmful to 
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given what we know about psychology, personal and business 
planning, the climate system, climate modeling capacity, and 
technology; otherwise we would not have much of a climate 
change policy problem in the first place. I do not discuss these 
premises further except where necessary to the analysis that 
follows below. Rather, my focus is on establishing that there 
will be people and businesses that believe they are climate 
change winners, and then on exploring what policy implications 
they present given how they might behave under these as-
sumptions.  
If I am right about the emergence of climate change win-
ners, they are likely soon to become a force in the climate policy 
dialogue as their enjoyment of substantial climate change bene-
fits alters not only the dispassionate cost-benefit analysis of 
mitigation and adaption measures, but also the political econ-
omy of climate policy. I write from the perspective that these 
influences will be of most concern to policymakers interested in 
pursuing effective mitigation policy and robust investment in 
harm-reducing adaptation measures to advance our nation’s 
climate agenda, and therefore I adopt that position as the ref-
erence point for examining how the emergence of a substantial 
class of climate change winners will influence that policy pack-
age’s success.  
Given this reference point, it is appropriate for me to make 
some disclosures and representations about my scope and pur-
pose. First, I do not purport to build econometric models of cli-
mate change at any scale—national, local, or individual—or to 
weigh in on the heated debates regarding the design and inter-
pretation of the expanding universe of IAM studies. Neverthe-
less, one unequivocal goal of the Article is to add reason to be-
lieve that mitigation policy should not rely on IAMs as much as 
it has, especially when taking climate change benefits into ac-
count. Second, I do not explore the psychology of how people 
form perceptions of what is harmful or beneficial to them gen-
erally. My inquiry picks up with the point at which they have 
formed such impressions about the market and nonmarket im-
pacts of climate change. However, from there I do explore the 
available psychological literature on whether and how people 
 
their personal welfare are significantly more likely to support climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies). On the other hand, people with an inte-
grated concern for intergenerational equity, carrying capacity, and resource 
scarcity, and who regard the biosphere as deserving of moral consideration, 
have been shown to be more willing to assume the costs of climate change pre-
vention. See id. 
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will associate those personal effects with climate change and 
how they will act on those associations. Third, I attach no nor-
mative moral significance to the idea that people may conclude 
they are climate change winners. For my purposes they are 
simply people who believe climate change has been or will be 
good to them. The question of whether holding such a belief is 
immoral is outside the scope of my inquiry;39 however, what 
they do about their beliefs in the political sphere raises norma-
tive questions I do explore. Fourth, my focus on climate change 
winners in the United States is not intended to trivialize the 
likelihood that people and businesses in the United States and 
many other nations will be overwhelmingly on the losing side of 
climate change.40 Given the likelihood of many winners in the 
United States, however, and given how important U.S. policy is 
to overall global action on climate change, it is useful to isolate 
the winners phenomenon in our nation to consider its domestic 
political impact. Finally, nothing about my description of cli-
mate change benefits and winners is intended to support the 
case for climate change skepticism or opposition to mitigation 
and adaptation policies.41
 
 39. It would be difficult to make the case that any descriptive morals 
against recognition of climate change benefits or beneficiaries have formed in 
the United States given the significant numbers of people who continue to be 
skeptical of climate change in general or, even if they believe it is happening, 
oppose more aggressive regulatory responses. Most Americans perceive of cli-
mate change as a low to medium political priority, and almost half of Ameri-
cans believe their local, state, and federal governments are devoting sufficient 
attention to climate change or should be doing even less. See ANTHONY 
LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE 
MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
AMERICAN MIND: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY POLICIES IN MAY 
2011, at 2–4 (2011) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MAY 2011] 
(producing results from a May 2011 survey of over 1000 interviews); ANTHONY 
LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE 
MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
AMERICAN MIND: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY POLICIES IN 
MARCH 2012, at 2 (2012) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MARCH 
2012] (producing results from a March 2012 survey of over 1000 interviews).  
 In fact, my purpose is just the oppo-
site. It is necessary, however, to describe the benefits and their 
beneficiaries in order to discuss the political implications and 
appropriate policy and legal responses.  
 40. See generally IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2 (describing gen-
erally the harms of climate change). 
 41. See LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MARCH 2012, supra note 39, at 2. 
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A. BENEFITS 
For purposes of the policy analysis following later in the 
Article, it is useful to divide climate change benefits into those 
that are direct consequences of the biophysical changes brought 
by climate change—such as longer growing seasons42
1. Direct Benefits  
—and 
benefits that flow indirectly from those biophysical changes—
such as the coffee shop experiencing increased business in an 
agricultural district enjoying longer growing seasons, or a busi-
ness selling adaptation products or services. The distinction is 
important to policy given how different the climate change 
winners associated with each are likely to be distributed and to 
perceive their benefits.  
Most of the direct benefits of climate change are associated 
with the initial warming of temperature regimes.43 Higher 
temperatures are, of course, the root of the climate change 
problem for most climate change losers, but consider that there 
are areas today which, for one reason or another, are held back 
in some way because they are cold, sometimes severely so. 
Hence, warming in such regions could produce benefits such as 
longer growing seasons for agriculture,44 reduced strain on 
transportation infrastructure from freezing,45 longer outdoor 
recreation and tourism seasons,46
 
 42. See Fisher et al., supra note 
 reduced health hazards of se-
8, at 2074. 
 43. See, e.g., TOL, supra note 13, at 30 (mentioning increased Arctic har-
bor access from melted ice as a benefit of climate warming). 
 44. See Fisher et al., supra note 8, at 2074 (“[L]arge gains are predicted 
for North America . . . due to longer planting windows and generally more fa-
vourable growing conditions under warming.”). See generally Johnston, supra 
note 17, at 33–36 (summarizing agriculture studies). 
 45. See TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (mentioning reduced traffic disruptions 
due to snow and ice); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, 
at 61 (“Decreased extreme cold will provide some benefits such as reduced 
snow and ice removal costs.”). 
 46. See Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 10 (“[S]ummer recreation is sub-
stantially larger than winter recreation and would increase with warming.”); 
SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (“Tourism will also face a mixed picture, 
with opportunities for winter tourism and some ecosystem uses declining, but 
being replaced in some cases by extended spring and summer recreation op-
portunities.”); TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (observing that tourism economies are 
likely to shift as a result of warming); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PRO-
GRAM, supra note 2, at 88 (“The length of the season for, and desirability of, 
several of the most popular activities—walking; visiting a beach, lakeshore, or 
river; sightseeing; swimming; and picnicking—are likely to be enhanced by 
small near-term increases in temperature.”). 
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vere cold,47 fewer work stoppages due to cold weather condi-
tions,48 lower winter heating bills,49 and better ocean transpor-
tation and resource extraction options in previously frozen re-
gions.50 Many people also simply enjoy mild climates and are 
willing to pay for them.51
Warming will also drive changes in precipitation patterns, 
in some areas to the benefit of some water users by increasing 
water availability.
 
52 More water, of course, can be a good or a 
bad thing, but the point is that it can be a good thing for many 
people.53 Increased water supplies could, for example, benefit 
agricultural land uses, reduce regional supply scarcity prob-
lems, and enhance hydropower production capacity.54
It is more difficult to predict with any detail the direct ben-
efits from other biophysical impacts of climate change. Indeed, 
here I have to speculate as there is such a paucity of robust 
studies of climate change benefits. Rising sea levels, for exam-
ple, will certainly have adverse effects on many existing coastal 
land uses. But it is not merely facetious to observe that some 
 
 
 47. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 48 (“Climate change is 
projected to bring some benefits in temperate areas, such as fewer deaths from 
cold exposure . . . .”). See generally Johnston, supra note 17, at 26–29 (summa-
rizing health effect studies). 
 48. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (offering the example of a 
roofing company able to extend its work season).  
 49. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7 (“Warmer tempera-
tures may result in higher energy bills for air conditioning in summer, and 
lower bills for heating in winter.”). 
 50. See Joshua Ho, The Implications of Arctic Sea Ice Decline on Shipping, 
34 MARINE POL’Y 713, 714 (2010) (predicting that “tremendous shipping bene-
fits would accrue” given that Arctic routes “would trim about 5000 nautical 
miles and a week’s sailing time” compared to routes using the Suez Canal); 
TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (mentioning improved harbor access, resource ex-
ploitation, and transport routes in the Arctic). 
 51. See Johnston, supra note 17, at 21–26 (summarizing studies showing 
mild climate as an amenity value). 
 52. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 30 
(noting that northern areas of the United States will become wetter). 
 53. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing “[t]he 
beneficial impacts of increased annual runoff in some areas”); U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7 (“An overall increase in precipitation may 
increase water availability in some regions, but also create greater flood po-
tential.”). 
 54. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC 
SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
MITIGATION: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12 (2012), available at http://srren 
.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Full_Report.pdf (“For hydropower the over-
all impacts on the global technical potential is expected to be slightly  
positive.”). 
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land areas will benefit from becoming closer to the coast, 
though exactly where, in what ways, and by how much are 
hard to say.55 Even more difficult to project are the benefits 
some people may derive from shifts in ecological regimes. Some 
species will migrate from one area to another to follow chang-
ing temperature and precipitation regimes.56 If a species exiting 
a region was considered undesirable by some people in the ar-
ea, or if a species moving into a new area is considered desira-
ble by some people in the area, they have potential climate 
change benefits. Indeed, some species will stay where they are 
but actually prosper from climate change,57
These and other direct benefits would, obviously, be con-
centrated around the areas where the relevant biophysical 
changes are occurring, though some benefits, such as more wa-
ter, could be transported considerable distances. This is not to 
say that all people in such areas will be beneficiaries, or that 
the biophysical changes always will produce some benefits. Ag-
riculture, for example, presents a complex set of conditions de-
fining where and when benefits of warming and precipitation 
can be secured, as temperature, carbon dioxide levels, precipi-
tation patterns, weeds, pests, and crop type all factor into the 
profile for any location.
 and if people in the 
area find the species desirable for whatever reason, there are 
potential climate change benefits. My point is that even the 
climate change impacts portrayed in climate policy dialogue as 
the sources of the worst of climate change—sea level rise and 
ecological shifting—will nonetheless produce some direct bene-
fits for some people in some places.  
58
 
 55. See Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 10–12 (discussing the economic dy-
namics of coastal transitions and noting that high-value coastal areas are like-
ly to be protected through adaptation measures such as sea walls). 
 Overall, however, we can expect direct 
 56. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7 (“The range and 
distribution of many species will change.”). There is evidence such adaptive 
responses already are occurring. See David Nogués-Bravo & Carsten Rahbek, 
Communities Under Climate Change, 334 SCIENCE 1070 (2011) (advocating for 
new large-scale and interdisciplinary research approaches to measure species 
movement and adaptation due to climate change). 
 57. See Nogués-Bravo & Rahbek, supra note 56, at 1070 (“Other species 
will cope with climate change in situ or perish.”). 
 58. See Supit et al., supra note 8, at 693 (explaining the various factors in 
connection with research showing that the benefits of increased carbon dioxide 
levels may reduce the adverse effects of increasing temperatures for some 
crops in some areas); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 2 (describ-
ing the interaction of warming, carbon dioxide, water, and nutrients); see also 
Wolfram Schlenker et al., Will U.S. Agriculture Really Benefit from Global 
Warming? Accounting for Irrigation in the Hedonic Approach, 95 AM. ECON. 
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climate change benefits to concentrate in some magnitude in 
some areas where temperatures rise, precipitation increases, 
and other biophysical climate change effects take hold in ways 
offering economic benefits directly to people and businesses in 
geographic proximity to the physical impacts.  
Generally speaking, temperature-driven direct benefits 
will favor areas in northern latitudes and higher altitudes—i.e., 
the areas currently more likely to be suffering the downsides of 
being cold.59 The areas benefitting from increased precipitation 
are not as easily generalized given how sensitive local water 
balances can be to climate,60 though most models have identi-
fied the Northeastern United States as receiving more precipi-
tation and the Southwest receiving less.61
2. Indirect Benefits  
 Rising sea levels will 
affect all coastal areas, and shifting ecosystems are likely to af-
fect the entire nation, making it extremely difficult to predict 
beyond the fact that there will be some benefits in some places 
as a result of these and similarly ubiquitous changes.  
Whereas the most significant sources of direct climate 
change benefits—increased temperature and precipitation—are 
likely to produce patchy geographies with areas of concentrated 
benefits and harms, indirect climate change benefits are more 
likely to produce opportunities everywhere. This is because 
there will be indirect benefits flowing from both the direct ben-
efits and the direct harms of climate change. Far more than is 
the case for direct benefits, therefore, the indirect benefits of 
climate change follow no predictable geographic patterns—they 
can arise virtually anywhere, anytime, for anyone. No area of 
the nation, no neighborhood in the nation, will be without the 
 
REV. 395 (2005) (arguing that costs of irrigation in drying areas must be taken 
into account). The result is a complex geography of winner and loser agricul-
tural districts. It is expected, for example, that agriculture in California and 
North Carolina will, on balance, be substantial losers whereas Georgia and 
Arizona will be substantial winners. See Deschênes & Greenstone, supra note 
8, at 357 (summary), 378 (chart of state outcomes).  
 59. See Johnston, supra note 11, at 38–39, 41. 
 60. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 30 
(explaining the difficulty of predicting local precipitation impacts); Mendel-
sohn et al., supra note 10, at 165 (noting that “[w]ater supply and demand in 
specific regions can change dramatically across climate scenarios”). 
 61. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 47 (map of world pro-
jected precipitation pattern changes), 49 (map of world projected relative 
changes in runoff ); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, 
at 31 (map of North America projected precipitation pattern changes). 
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availability of some indirect benefits from climate change at 
some point over the next one hundred years in one or more of 
the following forms. 
a. Direct Benefit Spillovers 
Areas receiving substantial direct benefits of climate 
change are an obvious case for indirect benefits in the form of 
positive spillovers. The farmer that benefits directly from a 
longer growing season purchases more fertilizer and gasoline, 
spends more at local restaurants, and so on. The farmer’s in-
creased prosperity generates benefits for others who in turn 
continue rippling benefits through the economy. The growing 
prosperity of the area in general may attract additional immi-
grants and investments, thus fueling the local concentration of 
benefits and beneficiaries. An influx of immigrants could im-
prove real estate markets and other sectors of a local economy. 
Even some of the refugees from hard hit areas may find their 
situations improved substantially above what their lives were 
like back home prior to climate change. An entire local economy 
might begin to thrive as indirect spillover benefits piggyback 
direct benefits.  
b. Adaptation Products and Services 
Indirect benefits of climate change will not be limited to 
areas with large sources of direct benefits. Areas feeling more 
climate change harms than benefits, even lopsidedly so, will 
need to invest in public infrastructure adaptation measures 
such as seawalls, health services, and reconstruction of struc-
tures damaged by storm surges and floods.62 People living in 
such areas will need climate proofing for homes, air condition-
ing, insurance products, and so on. The demand for these public 
and private adaptive products and services may lead to techno-
logical advances, such as new insulation materials, new insur-
ance products, and new crop strains, positioning businesses 
selling the new products to profit substantially.63
 
 62. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 
 
4, at 4 (offering the possibility of 
the insurance industry “assisting homeowners and business in reducing losses 
by taking appropriate adaptive action”). 
 63. See id. at 3–4 (offering the examples of new crop strains, new insur-
ance products, new climate proofing materials, and new building designs); see, 
e.g., OLIVER WYMAN FIN. SERVS., CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS AND OPPORTUNI-
TIES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 1–6 (2007) (examining numerous up-
sides and means of “[c]apturing the opportunity” of climate change for finan-
cial service providers).  
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Adaptation benefits will not be limited to areas where ad-
aptation products and services are in demand. Whether a busi-
ness thrives by selling its wares to people that are directly ben-
efitted or directly harmed, and whether it sells them locally or 
online, it benefits indirectly from climate change. A business 
selling a new climate proofing material thus could operate from 
anywhere, and an individual investor in that business could 
live anywhere, as well.  
c. Comparative Advantages 
Climate change is likely to disrupt existing comparative 
advantages in a variety of product and service industries, par-
ticularly agriculture, meaning some benefits will emerge in ar-
eas of the United States that enjoy newfound comparative 
prowess.64 For example, even if conditions for a particular glob-
ally important crop decline in the United States, so long as they 
are declining less drastically here than in other nations, our 
growing regions for the crop may prosper.65 Even within the 
United States, similar shifts in comparative advantages could 
produce benefits in areas formerly not in comparative ad-
vantage to other regions. Some businesses will also profit from 
climate change simply because they are better at managing for 
its risks than other companies, thereby gaining competitive ad-
vantage.66 In general, climate change will spur global, regional, 
national, and local economic transformations which, like any 
large-scale economic change process, are likely to produce vast 
numbers of winners and losers.67
 
 64. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 106 
(“Climate change also has the potential to alter trade relationships by chang-
ing the comparative trade advantages of regions or nations.”). 
 
 65. See id. 
 66. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 4 (offering the examples of 
businesses that avoid locking in high-value assets in high-risk areas well be-
fore other competitors); Jonathan Lash & Fred Wellington, Competitive Ad-
vantage on a Warming Planet, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2007, at 95, 96 (“[A] 
company’s climate-related risk mitigation and product strategies can create 
competitive advantage.”). 
 67. Cf., e.g., SANDRA POLASKI, WINNERS AND LOSERS: IMPACT OF THE 
DOHA ROUND ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES passim (2006) (examining how 
trade agreements might make “net winners and net losers” out of developing 
nations); Nancy Birdsall & John Nellis, Winners and Losers: Assessing the Dis-
tributional Impact of Privatization, 31 WORLD DEV. 1617, 1622–25 (2003) (dis-
cussing the distributional effects of privatization in formerly state-dominated 
economies); Elizabeth Brainerd, Winners and Losers in Russia’s Economic 
Transition, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1094 passim (1998) (studying winners and los-
  
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS 227 
 
d. Regulatory Benefits 
New federal, state, and local climate change mitigation and 
adaptation regulations necessarily will create opportunities for 
people and businesses to take advantage of the new regulatory 
programs for economic gain. This effect is well established by 
examples such as wetlands mitigation banking, where regula-
tory programs require someone destroying a protected wetland 
to compensate for the loss, and the method of choice is to pur-
chase credits from someone else who has improved wetlands 
elsewhere.68 Somewhat perversely, this wetland credits indus-
try exists and prospers only because other industries fill wet-
lands and must comply with regulations, but it exists nonethe-
less.69 It seems only likely that climate change mitigation and 
adaptation regulations fashioned around different regulatory 
models will create similar opportunities for people and busi-
nesses to derive regulatory benefits. New regulatory programs 
could also erect barriers to entry that may advantage existing 
firms in an industry, as well as present opportunities for com-
parative advantage effects as some firms will be able to develop 
more effective strategies for obtaining incentives and other 
compliance benefits.70
B. BENEFICIARIES 
  
Just as there will be different kinds of climate change ben-
efits, so too will there be different kinds of people and business-
es taking advantage of them. A policy-relevant typology of po-
tential beneficiaries includes at least the following somewhat 
overlapping groups. 
 
ers in terms of wage disparity in a large-scale economic transformation con-
text). 
 68. For background information on wetland mitigation banking, see Royal 
C. Gardner, Mitigation, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING 
SECTION 404, at 253 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005); Palmer Hough & 
Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: 
Where It Comes From, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15 
(2009). 
 69. See Hough & Robertson, supra note 68, at 24 (explaining that busi-
nesses “acquire these [wetland] credits to meet their compensatory mitigation 
requirements”). 
 70. See Daniel L. Millimet et al., Environmental Regulations and Econom-
ic Activity: Influence on Market Structure, 2009 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 
99, 100 (“Environmental regulation may affect market structure by modifying 
. . . entry of new firms . . . and the relative competitive advantage of active 
firms.”), 110 (“[R]egulation affects the incentive of firms to invest in technolo-
gy adoption, innovation, and research and development . . . .”). 
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1. Passive 
Many will benefit from climate change without any 
thought or change in behavior at all. The farmer enjoying a 
longer growing season has done nothing other than add more 
days to the routine of work and expenditures. A roofing compa-
ny benefitting from longer outdoor construction seasons does 
nothing but keep workers working. A family whose heating 
bills fall because of fewer cold days has done nothing other than 
keep the thermostat set at the same temperature they would 
have anyway. A shipping line in high latitudes where the ice 
season is short does nothing but keep shipping. The coffee shop 
doing a brisker business in a newly prospering agricultural 
town does nothing but pour more coffee. No calculated move is 
needed for these and similarly situated people and businesses 
to benefit directly or indirectly from climate change—rather, 
they benefit passively.  
Passive beneficiaries of climate change nevertheless are 
likely to become acculturated to the new good times. Although 
they have not actively sought their benefits, they no doubt will 
invest in them, such as the farmer who purchases new equip-
ment and the coffee shop that has expanded to meet new busi-
ness.71
2. Adaptive 
 Many passive beneficiaries of climate change, therefore, 
may begin to behave as if they are invested in and entitled to 
their climate change benefits when it comes to mitigation and 
adaptation policies.  
Unlike passive beneficiaries, who benefit simply by profit-
ably doing more of what they were doing before climate change, 
some people and businesses facing deteriorating conditions as a 
result of climate change will respond by adapting in ways that 
may ultimately prove highly beneficial. An example comes from 
the West Coast’s wine production industry, where extensive 
modeling suggests that by sticking with their current wine 
grapes, growers in California and Washington face significant 
losses of suitable production acres, but that “adaptation to the 
warming, such as the introduction of heat-tolerant varieties of 
 
 71. See, e.g., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 
73 (noting that farmers adapting to climate change will have to adjust “a wide 
range of farming practices,” including buying potentially expensive stress-
tolerant seeds and investing in new equipment); Ho, supra note 50, at 714–15 
(arguing that vessels seeking to take advantage of a Northern Sea Route cre-
ated by global warming will need improved ship technology). 
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grapes, could sharply reduce the losses in California and turn 
the Washington loss into a 150% gain.”72
The point is that climate change could spur adaptations 
that lead to economic outcomes for some people and businesses 
superior to their previous conditions. A farmer who shifts to 
high-value crops, a ski area that moves heavily into lucrative 
warm weather recreation, a clothing store that stocks more 
popular warm weather outfitting—these people and businesses 
are not passively benefitting, but neither are they passively sit-
ting back and taking their climate change licks.
 Washington may be 
the next California of wines. 
73
3. Opportunistic 
 Even more so 
than passive beneficiaries, we can expect such adaptive benefi-
ciaries, given their ingenuity and investment in the adaptive 
response, to feel positive about and entitled to their benefits.  
Some people and businesses will actively work to seize di-
rect and indirect benefit opportunities from climate change. 
Longer growing seasons, for example, may prompt some people 
to go into farming or farm supply businesses who otherwise 
might not have. More opportunistically, a business might work 
on developing new technologies to market to people harmed by 
climate change to adapt, such as climate proof building materi-
als, new forms of hot weather clothing, or improved seawall 
building techniques.74
 
 72. Richard A. Kerr, Vital Details of Global Warming Are Eluding Fore-
casters, 334 SCIENCE 173, 174 (2011). Similarly, cranberry crop production is 
expected to rise in Maine, and cranberry producers are seeking land there and 
even farther north into Canada. North Cairn, Climate Change May Boost 
State’s Cranberry Take, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Maine), Sept. 30, 2012, 
available at http://www.pressherald.com/news/climate-change-may-boost 
-states-cranberry-take_2012-09-30.html. 
 And most opportunistic of all, some peo-
ple will benefit from climate change by making shrewd invest-
ment decisions about which businesses will be climate change 
winners and losers.  
 73. Outcomes for agriculture and livestock industries in particular are 
sensitive to adaptive capacity, with efficient adaptations potentially yielding 
benefits in many cases. See Joel B. Smith & Jeffrey K. Lazo, A Summary of 
Climate Change Impact Assessments from the U.S. Country Studies Program, 
50 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 9–18 (2001).  
 74. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 57 tbl.4.1 (identifying 
what new technologies or investments might benefit various sectors, such as 
revenues from new attractions potentially boosting tourism); see, e.g., 
SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 30 (“[I]indoor recreation may substitute 
more frequently for outdoor recreation in areas that become uncomfortably 
hot.”). 
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This category of climate change beneficiaries, therefore, is 
defined by the calculated steps and changes in behavior they 
take to derive benefits from climate change. In other words, 
they set out to become climate change winners. Although savvy 
investors may be indifferent to mitigation policy, expecting they 
can find good positions under any changing scenario, many of 
the people and businesses who succeed at this opportunistic 
strategy are not likely to be receptive to aggressive mitigation 
policies. Moreover, they are likely to seek private and public in-
vestment in infrastructure necessary to make their benefits 
more secure. 
4. Migratory 
Some people will move because of climate change and will 
benefit as a result. All such people are opportunistic and adap-
tive in the sense that the direct or indirect effects of climate 
change motivated a change in their behavior, but some will ap-
pear more opportunistic than adaptive or passive. For example, 
some people might move simply to avoid severe harms of cli-
mate change,75
The point of creating such a category of migratory benefi-
ciaries is not, however, to focus on their passive, adaptive, or 
opportunistic behavior, but to emphasize the potential distribu-
tional effects of climate change benefits. The migratory re-
sponse may both disperse beneficiaries more widely and con-
centrate beneficiaries in some regions. Moreover, people and 
businesses making the investment to move as a result of cli-
 having no particular plan to benefit from cli-
mate change in their new home region but incidentally benefit-
ting directly and indirectly nonetheless. Another person might 
lose his or her job in one area because that employment sector 
is suffering a downturn as a result of climate change (for exam-
ple, a ski center employee), and decide to move to an area with 
a better employment outlook in some sectors because of climate 
change (for example, a beach resort enjoying warmer tempera-
tures). Yet more opportunistically, another person might move 
from a perfectly fine position in order to take an even better po-
sition, such as manager of a seawall construction company.  
 
 75. A number of legal scholars have identified climate-based migration as 
a significant issue for international and national policy. See, e.g., Kara K. 
Moberg, Note, Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Dis-
placed Persons Displaces Necessary Protection, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2009) 
(summarizing the commentary to suggest that current international and do-
mestic laws are inadequate to protect an increasing population of climate mi-
grants). 
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mate change, regardless of how opportunistically, and who 
come out benefitting as a result are likely to take that invest-
ment into account when asked by climate mitigation policy to 
yield the benefits they and their successors will enjoy.  
5. Subsistence 
Many climate change beneficiaries, whether passive, adap-
tive, opportunistic, migratory, or some combination thereof, will 
be net winners only in the sense that their lives are made a lit-
tle less miserable than they would have been without climate 
change.76
I treat such climate change circumstances in a separate 
“subsistence” category to emphasize that it is not only climate 
change losers who present sympathetic policy cases. Moreover, 
although only marginally ahead and perhaps not seeing them-
selves as winners in life generally, many people and businesses 
in the subsistence category might value their climate change 
benefits dearly and strongly wish to retain them. As they are 
also likely to be concentrated in areas of rural or urban poverty, 
they could organize into a substantial political force in some lo-
cal and state jurisdictions.  
 For example, a family in poverty living in an area of 
extreme cold might see heating bills slowly falling, or might 
have improved transportation options, or might find a little 
longer work season in agricultural fields. A struggling coffee 
shop in the area may also enjoy lower heating bills and perhaps 
a few more customers.  
II.  WHO ARE THE CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS?   
Thus far I have used the term “climate change winner” to 
refer to people and businesses who conclude that “life is good” 
because of climate change. Yet, although it is indisputable that 
there will be climate change benefits available to many people 
and businesses, that does not necessarily mean any of the bene-
ficiaries will actually be climate change winners or, correctly or 
not, believe they are. Before we can move from there being ben-
efits and their beneficiaries to there being winners in any sense 
meaningful to climate policy, it is necessary to step back and 
explore the idea of climate change winners in more detail. In 
 
 76. For example, although global warming will very likely ameliorate traf-
fic conditions by melting snow and ice, that “pale[s] in comparison to the big 
unknowns: extreme climate scenarios, the very long term, biodiversity loss, 
the possible effects of climate change on economic development and even polit-
ical violence.” TOL, supra note 13, at 17. 
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this part of the Article, therefore, I provide more clarity to what 
I mean by the term “climate change winner” and then examine 
evidence regarding whether any people and businesses will 
perceive themselves to be winners. 
A. DEFINING CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS 
Within the social sciences, “[t]he idea that global change 
produces winners and losers has become more or less accepted 
in the common discourse.”77 Think, for example, of sweeping 
technological change such as the Internet, or globalization of 
trade and the economy, or large-scale war, or the vast political 
upheavals experienced in many regions of the world—is it con-
ceivable that these global forces of change produce only win-
ners, or only losers, or are completely neutral? Any such claim 
would be taken as ludicrous.78
But what exactly do we mean by “winners” and “losers” in 
the context of global change? Their definitions have received 
little discussion in the global change literature. However, geog-
raphers Karen O’Brien and Robin Leichenko recently provided 
a systematic theoretical examination of these concepts using 
economic globalization and climate change as case studies.
 Why would climate change be 
any different? 
79 
The general framework they develop for thinking about win-
ners and losers under scales of global change is especially use-
ful in the context of climate change impacts.80
First, “winners” and “losers” in the global change context 
are usually meant to refer not to static characterizations re-
flecting current inequalities, but to “dynamic characterizations 
that emphasize identification of winners and losers following 
an event or in conjunction with longer-term processes.”
 
81
 
 77. O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 
 To be 
sure, the pre-existing inequalities may influence who are win-
ners and losers as the dynamic changes play out, but the global 
14, at 89. 
 78. See supra note 67. Nor is global change, with its winners and losers, a 
new phenomenon. See CHARLES C. MANN, 1493 (2011) (providing a detailed 
history of global change impacts during the 1400s–1600s). 
 79. O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 89; see 
also Karen L. O’Brien & Robin M. Leichenko, Double Exposure: Assessing the 
Impacts of Climate Change Within the Context of Economic Globalization, 10 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 221 (2000) [hereinafter O’Brien & Leichenko, Double 
Exposure].  
 80. O’Brien & Leichenko, Double Exposure, supra note 79, at 223–25. 
 81. O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 90. 
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change process may amplify, ameliorate, or alter those patterns 
of inequality.82
Second, the dynamic characterizations most pertinent to 
global change involve structural processes rather than the 
more conventional idea of winners and losers from specific vol-
untary events.
 
83 Thus, “structural winners and losers emerge 
from larger societal processes or changes, whereby the distribu-
tion of the impacts is unequal, such that gains and losses ac-
crue differentially to participants.”84 Moreover, the winners and 
losers are not necessarily participating in the global change 
process by choice, and their knowledge of all the gains and loss-
es throughout the global system may be incomplete.85
Third, winning and losing can be thought of in absolute or 
relative terms. Absolute wins and losses are judged based on 
comparison of one’s status before and after the relevant event 
or change, whereas relative wins and losses are judged based 
on comparison to the situation of others.
  
86 Someone who is bet-
ter off in relative terms might feel like a winner even if he or 
she is not better off in absolute terms, just as someone better 
off in absolute terms may feel like a loser if he or she is worse 
off in relative terms.87
Fourth, the identification of winners and losers could be 
based on self-identification by the winners and losers them-
selves or on a third-party judgment, such as a government 
agency measuring various metrics of gains and losses and an-
nouncing who has won and who has lost.
 
88 Self-identification 
has the advantage of setting the criteria internally, which obvi-
ates the need for agreement on the metrics but opens the door 
to a host of political and personal motives for misidentifica-
tion.89
 
 82. See id. 
 Similarly, if external third-party metrics are used, the 
assessment of what counts as gains and losses could be framed 
according to purely neoclassical economic indicators such as in-
come, or on Marxian political-economic theory that includes 
consideration of political power imbalances and economic de-
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id.  
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 90–91. 
 89. For example, there may be psychological motives for individuals to 
self-identify as winners to claim superiority or as losers to seek sympathy and 
aid. See id.  
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pendency; in either case requiring subjective decisions by the 
third-party assessment authority.90
Lastly, the scale at which winners and losers are assessed 
is vitally important for understanding the political and econom-
ic impacts of global change.
  
91 Aggregating “wins” and “losses” at 
smaller scales to assess the “net” status at larger scales can 
mask the presence of winners and losers at the smaller scale.92 
A net loser nation, for example, could have many “winner” in-
dividuals and businesses within its borders, and even signifi-
cant net winner regions and industries, just as a winner nation 
could have many losers.93
My interest in identifying climate change winners is in as-
sessing their potential impacts on the politics of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Consistent with most treatments of 
the topic, I am primarily concerned, therefore, with how people 
and businesses at local scales self-identify their absolute and 
relative changes in situation from economic gains and losses 
throughout the dynamic, structural process of global climate 
change.
 
94
First, I am concerned with what people and businesses be-
lieve they are based on their absolute and relative self-
assessments,
 To clarify this definition further, consider what it in-
cludes and excludes.  
95 not what government agencies or other organi-
zations tell them they are.96
 
 90. See id. at 91–92. 
 Of course, never mentioning cli-
mate change winners in official statements, or even calling all 
people climate change losers, might condition people against 
self-identifying as winners, but that framing strategy can only 
go so far in the face of tangible climate change benefits. In any 
event, I cover the evidence on self-identification and framing 
 91. See id. at 98 (stating that the assessments of winners and losers from 
climate change are further complicated with issues relating to spatial and 
temporal scales). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 97 (“Winners are usually referred to in terms of improved 
conditions, opportunities, positive effects, and benefits . . . .”).  
 95. Although people who are relative winners but significant absolute los-
ers are unlikely to exhibit the kind of policy preferences of concern to my in-
quiry, belief that one is a winner is all that matters to my analysis. Whether a 
person or business arrives at that conclusion based on relative comparisons, 
absolute comparisons, or a hybrid is inconsequential. 
 96. See O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 90–
91. 
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later, as the ultimate number of winners does not affect how we 
define who they are.  
Second, I measure winner status in purely economic terms, 
not through a political theory frame. It is likely that some peo-
ple and businesses who are winners under my definition might 
put that status in the political back seat were they to perceive 
they are disfavored by strong political imbalances or economic 
dependencies separately wrought by climate change.97
Third, I am concerned with sub-national scales, particular-
ly local scales at which winners could concentrate sufficiently 
to dominate political discourse. Most legal scholarship has fo-
cused on whether the United States is a potential winner 
among nations and how the winner nations (generally the de-
veloped economies) should assist the loser nations (generally 
developing nations not significantly responsible for past green-
house gas emissions).
 Howev-
er, there is little research on the political effects—even less 
than what exists on economic benefits. Hence, while recogniz-
ing the potential for such perceptions to offset economic gains 
in terms of how people self-identify, in the absence of firm evi-
dence supporting such an effect in the context of climate 
change, I limit my definition to a neoclassical economics version 
of gains and losses.  
98
Finally, it is likely that many people and businesses will 
thrive during climate change for reasons unrelated to climate 
change benefits; for example, through the effects of globalized 
trade and technological innovations.
 Although those questions surely will 
play into domestic climate policy, uneven distribution of win-
ners and losers within the United States is potentially a far 
more divisive political force.  
99
What we should care about, in other words, are people and 
businesses who believe they are better off economically as a re-
sult of climate change. They are the climate change winners.  
 Winners in that category 
might oppose mitigation policy because of its cost or some other 
reason, but that is not my concern. There is already no short-
age of such people and businesses, so having more or less of 
them does not present a qualitatively different policy dynamic.  
 
 97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 98. See id. at 97–98. 
 99. See id. at 94–97. 
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B. WILL THE WINNERS KNOW WHO THEY ARE? 
One skeptical about the importance of climate change win-
ners might assert that most people or businesses, notwith-
standing their receipt of climate change benefits sufficient to 
plausibly support their self-identification as climate change 
winners so defined, will nonetheless not self-identify as win-
ners. Arguably, an overwhelming moral sense of others’ suffer-
ing, or a fear of the general global instability likely to be 
wrought by climate change, or a deep shame in claiming winner 
status among the sea of losers, could dissuade anyone who ben-
efits substantially because of climate change from self-
identifying as a climate change winner. Yet, while arguments 
such as these present profound moral and behavioral questions, 
very little is known about what people and businesses actually 
think and say about climate change benefits and their possible 
status as winners, because no studies have asked the right 
questions.100 Indeed, even studies purporting objectively and in 
balanced framings to test and evaluate peoples’ knowledge of 
climate change and its impacts systematically omit references 
to possible benefits.101
It neglects the interdependency among people and assumes that the 
misfortune of some will have little or no negative impact on those who 
have benefitted . . . . Further, attending to the adverse impacts of cli-
mate change is consistent with the psychological ethical principle of 
avoiding harm and ensuring human welfare and psychologists’ work 
 In perhaps the most blatant of all such 
examples, a task force of the American Psychological Associa-
tion explicitly wrote climate change winners out of the picture 
based not on any evidence there will be no winners, but on its 
own ethical orientation, arguing that mention of winners ne-
gates concern about “losers.”  
 
 100. With one exception, see infra note 108, I have located no survey of 
public attitudes on climate change asking in any meaningful detail about per-
ceived benefits of climate change. 
 101. One survey, for example, asked respondents whether they agree that 
“global warming will increase crop yields in some places, and decrease it in 
others” and “will cause some places to get wetter, while others will get drier,” 
but otherwise identified no potential benefits associated with such effects. See 
ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ & NICOLAS SMITH, YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE COMMC’N, KNOWLEDGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE ACROSS GLOBAL WARM-
ING’S SIX AMERICAS 37–38 (2010). Another survey asked people in one county 
to describe effects they had experienced and expected to experience from cli-
mate change, but offered only adverse effects such as “forest fires,” “public 
health problems,” and “more insects such as ticks and mosquitoes.” See Karen 
Akerlof et al., Do People “Personally Experience” Global Warming, and If So 
How, and Does It Matter?, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE (forthcoming 2013) (man-
uscript at 8), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.07.006. 
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with marginalized groups who are most apt to experience negative 
impacts. For reasons such as these, we focus on the risks and nega-
tive impacts of climate change.102
None of the reasons given, however, is a good reason to ig-
nore how people will perceive climate change benefits and their 
potential status as winners. Speaking of winners does not ne-
gate concern about losers. Indeed, as I explain later in the Arti-
cle, not paying attention to winners only exacerbates the barri-
ers to effective mitigation and adaptation policies designed to 
help climate change losers. Given that we know benefits will 
occur, such biased studies thus systematically fail to provide a 
complete picture of what people believe about climate change 
and how they form those beliefs. 
 
It is difficult to learn much about how people perceive cli-
mate change benefits from studies framing climate change as 
only a harmful phenomenon, because how the impacts of cli-
mate change are framed in attitude survey questions is likely 
to change how respondents describe their perceptions of climate 
change. As psychologists Alexa Spence and Nick Pidgeon ex-
plain: 
[W]hat we individually consider to be ‘dangerous’ climate change in-
volves at minimum judgments about uncertain and complex science, 
potential impacts far into the future, as well as the perceptions and 
values we use to establish whether a particular outcome is acceptable 
or not. As a result, it is impossible to present information about cli-
mate change in a neutral manner without some kind of context, and 
therefore the way in which such information is ‘framed’ is para-
mount.103
They found, for example, that people are more receptive to 
climate change mitigation policy if it is framed as providing a 
benefit rather than avoiding a loss.
  
104
Indeed, we do learn from some studies—biased as they 
may be against recognition of climate change benefits—that 
 It stands to reason that 
people may also respond differently about climate change if 
studies include questions framed around the sources of market 
and nonmarket benefits from climate change.  
 
 102. TASK FORCE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY & GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, PSYCHOLOGY & GLOBAL CLI-
MATE CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTIFACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF 
CHALLENGES 14 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/science/about/ 
publications/climate_change.aspx. 
 103. Alexa Spence & Nick Pidgeon, Framing and Communicating Climate 
Change: The Effects of Distance and Outcome Frame Manipulations, 20 GLOB-
AL ENVTL. CHANGE 656, 657 (2010). 
 104. Id. at 664. 
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people are not ruling out the possibility of being winners. Some 
even seem to relish the idea. For example, in a series of surveys 
Anthony Leiserowitz and Nicolas Smith conducted, when asked 
generally whether climate change overall would be more bene-
ficial than harmful, almost a third of respondents said that is 
“definitely false.”105 Significantly, however, the same number 
said that this was only “probably false,” a little over a quarter 
of respondents did not know, and a combined twelve percent 
said it was “probably true” or “definitely true” that climate 
change would be more beneficial than harmful.106 And while 
almost two-thirds of respondents in that survey believe that 
climate change on balance will probably or definitely be harm-
ful overall, significant numbers in a related survey leave room 
for themselves being among the winners, or at least not signifi-
cant losers. Only about a third of respondents believed they will 
be harmed by climate change “a great deal” or “a moderate 
amount,” whereas over half believe they will be harmed “only a 
little” or “not at all” and just under a half believe climate 
change will harm their families “only a little” or “not at all.”107
More on point, climate change researchers J.P. Palutikof, 
M.D. Agnew, and M.R. Hoaret asked people in Scotland and 
Southern England a series of questions framed around the cli-
mate extremes of hot dry summers and unusually warm win-
ters.
  
108 Respondents evidenced “deep concerns about global 
warming tempered by an appreciation that there is potential 
for both positive and negative outcomes.”109 Respondents from 
Scotland, where it is colder and wetter than Southern England, 
saw more positives, including improved agriculture, tourism, 
and lower energy costs as market benefits and greater sociabil-
ity and increased outdoor activity as nonmarket benefits,110
 
 105. LEISEROWITZ & SMITH, supra note 
 
leading the researchers to conclude that “regional differences in 
climate could at least in part explain the apparent geographic 
101, at 40. The survey preparers 
explain that they view the question not as one of truth or falsity but “ultimate-
ly a value judgment.” Id. at 77. 
 106. Id. at 40.  
 107. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLI-
MATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS’ GLOBAL WARMING BE-
LIEFS AND ATTITUDES IN MAY 2011, at 4 (2011) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ, BE-
LIEFS AND ATTITUDES].  
 108. Palutikof et al., supra note 31, at 43. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 54–58.  
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differences in responses.”111
How will people make those assessments as climate change 
harms and benefits begin to take hold over the landscape and 
throughout the economy in more tangible forms than they have 
thus far? For one thing, a number of objective metrics will be 
available, such as the days in growing seasons, the household 
heating bill, profits from sale of climate proofing materials, 
and, obviously, the temperature. Even with these available in-
dicators, it is unlikely that people or businesses will be able to 
comprehensively and objectively evaluate all the market and 
nonmarket impacts of climate change and arrive at accurate 
personal cost-benefit calculations. They are more likely to rely 
heavily on subjective and relative assessments about what is 
most important to them to decide whether life is good. For ex-
ample, demographers Sammy Zahran, Samuel D. Brody, 
Himanshu Grover, and Arnold Vedlitz framed a number of sce-
narios designed to present what the authors believed would 
present objective risks from climate change. They found that 
risk perception, rather than objective risk, is “far more robust” 
for explaining how people conceive climate change will affect 
their lives.
 Of course, people who believe they 
will be better off may turn out to be wrong, but they may be 
right. The point is that people do seem to be forming their own 
methods of climate impact assessment and, whether accurate 
or not, forming beliefs about their potential loser or winner sta-
tus.  
112 To say the least, however, risk perception is a 
highly complex phenomenon riddled with cognitive processes 
that can lead to departures between objective and perceived 
risks.113
It is also unclear the extent to which people and businesses 
will connect life being good (or bad), or better (or worse), to cli-
mate change. Palutikof, Agnew, and Hoaret conclude from their 
studies, however, that respondents “indicate[d] a high level of 
awareness of the impacts of climate extremes.”
  
114 Similarly, 
Spence and Pidgeon summarize the literature showing people 
can distinguish between personal and societal impacts of cli-
mate change, with personal risks often judged to be lower than 
societal risks.115
 
 111. Id. at 43. 
 People thus seem to be assigning climate 
 112. Zahran et al., supra note 38, at 784. 
 113. Id. at 774–76.  
 114. Palutikof et al., supra note 31, at 43. 
 115. See Spence & Pidgeon, supra note 103, at 657. 
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change as the causal source of particular social and personal 
harms and benefits.116
Although I cannot resolve these complex cognitive ques-
tions, a few observations offer compelling reasons to pay closer 
attention to climate change benefits and winners. First, if it is 
in fact the case that people and businesses simply cannot con-
nect climate change as a causal source of harms and benefits in 
their and others’ lives and livelihoods, there is little reason to 
believe that effective mitigation policy will ever gain traction. 
People would simply seek private and public investment in ad-
aptation, not knowing that they are adapting to climate 
change, and would pay little attention to any need to invest in 
mitigation. Alternatively, if it seems more likely that people 
and businesses will not be entirely oblivious to what is going on 
around them, particularly given how prevalent climate change 
is in the media and politics, then it follows that they will make 
connections between climate change and its harms and bene-
fits. That is, why would there be cognitive asymmetry in that 
people have the capacity to recognize only climate change 
harms? Why would a farmer, for example, attribute introduc-
tion of a new pest or weed to climate change, but not make a 
similar association regarding the consistently lengthening 
growing season, thinking it is just a case of long-term serendip-
ity? Comprehensively or not, accurately or not, it seems far 
more likely from the limited attitudinal studies thus far touch-
ing on climate change benefits that people will begin to attach 
climate change as the causal source of some of the losses and 
gains they experience in life. 
 Again, their assessments may be wrong, 
but they may be right, the point being that people are con-
sciously perceiving climate change as a source of harms and 
benefits.  
Assuming that is the case, will any people or businesses 
perceiving substantial benefits from climate change have rea-
son to conclude they are winners, and will their numbers be 
substantial? At one level this is an empirical question—will 
benefits outweigh harms in the minds of many? At another lev-
el it is a behavioral question—will such people and businesses 
decide to think like winners? On the empirical component, al-
though climate change benefits have been systematically un-
derstudied, what attention has been given to them suggests 
that many winners will emerge. As explained previously in 
 
 116. Id.; see also Akerlof et al., supra note 101, at 8. 
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Part I, the agriculture sector is likely to have substantial areas 
of improved conditions over the next one hundred years, par-
ticularly when efficient adaptations are factored in. If some of 
the models are correct, moreover, overall economic performance 
in the United States over the next one hundred years is not 
grim by any means.117
Of course, as is explained in more detail later in the Arti-
cle, all such gains for people and businesses are likely to be 
transitory over long timeframes without effective global mitiga-
tion policies eventually being put in place. But that does not 
avoid the question of what to do about people and businesses 
who believe they are winners over near terms. If you do not be-
lieve there will be any of them in the next one hundred years, 
or not enough to matter, the prospect of climate change win-
ners is a blip on the climate policy screen not worth worrying 
about. Yet even if you believe that there very well may be a 
substantial number of people (and thus possibly entire commu-
nities), and businesses (and thus possibly entire industries) 
over the next one hundred years who believe they are climate 
change winners and behave like winners, you still might also 
question whether they will have any policy significance. In oth-
er words, will having them think and behave like winners pre-
sent substantial policy challenges? I turn to that question in 
the next part of the Article.  
 Even assuming it falls clearly on the 
negative side, presumably there will be a distribution of indi-
vidual personal and business outcomes with some falling on the 
positive side.  
III.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
WINNERS   
Based on the studies discussed in Parts I and II, we can 
reasonably assume that climate change benefits will flow to 
substantial numbers of people and businesses and that many of 
the beneficiaries will perceive themselves to be climate change 
winners. So what? Will they make any difference in climate pol-
icy? There is every reason to believe they will at the very least 
complicate the politics of climate mitigation and adaptation, 
possibly suppressing support for greenhouse gas regulation and 
diverting resources away from harm-reducing adaptation 
measures. Of course, it is every bit as likely that climate 
 
 117. Again, the methods and outcomes of IAMs, and even the propriety of 
using them at all, are hotly contested matters. See supra note 6. 
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change losers will want their say in climate policy, and that 
their interests will often diverge from the winners’ interests. 
Climate policy, in other words, is soon to become not just about 
a tradeoff between the present and the future, but also a 
tradeoff between winners and losers at any given time. Hence it 
is worth us thinking now about how climate change winners 
will think about climate policy.  
A. THINKING LIKE A CLIMATE CHANGE WINNER 
It is well established that the public is currently divided 
over climate policy and the extent of climate change harms.118
Acknowledging this vacuum of behavioral knowledge, sev-
eral factors suggest the emergence of climate change winners 
across the nation will be complex and problematic for climate 
policy. Consider first that because of the “committed warming” 
effect,
 
Because no attitude studies ask people about climate change 
benefits in any detail, however, respondents are never put in 
the position of evaluating climate policy from the perspective of 
having received climate change benefits, much less being a cli-
mate change winner. And since there are not yet any substan-
tial climate change benefits to be secured, we do not know 
much about how people will really behave in the political arena 
once there are. 
119 climate policy is currently centered around a debate 
over whether, how, by how much, and when to stabilize green-
house gas emissions, which only well after that would stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, which only 
well after that would (possibly) stabilize the climate in some 
new (presently unknown) set of conditions.120
 
 118. See LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MARCH 2012, supra note 
  
39, pas-
sim (policy opposition); LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MAY 2011, supra note 
39, passim (policy opposition); LEISEROWITZ, BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES, supra 
note 107, passim (disbelief). 
 119. The committed warming effect stems from the fact that “no matter 
how aggressively heat-trapping emissions are reduced, some amount of cli-
mate change and resulting impacts will continue due to effects of gases that 
have already been released.” U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, su-
pra note 2, at 11. 
 120. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 72 (“Anthropogenic 
warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries even if GHG emis-
sions were to be reduced sufficiently for GHG concentrations to stabilize, due 
to the time scales associated with climate processes and feedbacks.”); Richard 
A. Kerr, How Urgent Is Climate Change?, 318 SCIENCE 1230, 1230 (2007) 
(“The system has built-in time lags. Ice sheets take centuries to melt after a 
warming. The atmosphere takes decades to be warmed by today’s greenhouse 
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This means no person alive today is likely to experience the 
hoped-for climate benefits of mitigation policy put in place to-
day. In fact, no person living at any point in time now and into 
the distant future is likely to experience the climate benefits of 
regulatory policies put into place during his or her lifetime. 
Moreover, it is difficult to model with much precision exactly 
what greenhouse gas emission reduction is needed to stabilize 
climate and when and by how much any future climate stabili-
zation effects will accrue from any given regulatory scenario.121 
As Professor Eric Biber has comprehensively outlined, this 
double-whammy of the delayed effects and uncertain outcomes 
of mitigation policy makes convincing the public to invest in 
and bear the costs of aggressive emissions regulation measures 
a tough sell politically—it asks people at any given time to 
make sacrifices in their lives for the unknown chance of reduc-
ing unknown harms by an unknown extent on behalf of un-
known numbers of people at an unknown point in the future.122
Now add to that dynamic the climate change winners dy-
namic. Given that climate change will take place for hundreds 
of years into the future regardless of mitigation policies taken 
today or at any point in the next one hundred years, there will 
be a class of people along the way who perceive their situation 
to be improving because of climate change—people who notice 
their growing season is lengthening, their beaches are more 
pleasant, their outdoor recreation business is picking up, their 
new climate proofing invention is selling like mad. Persuading 
  
 
gas emissions.”); V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthro-
pogenic Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 
105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14245, 14245 (2008) (estimating committed warm-
ing of 2.4°C even if greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Su-
san Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emis-
sions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) (estimating a 1000-year 
committed warming effect). 
 121. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 44–47 (discussing vari-
ous emission stabilisation scenarios and impact projections), 73 (“Uncertainty 
in the equilibrium climate sensitivity creates uncertainty in the expected 
warming for a given CO2-eq stabilisation scenario. Uncertainty in the carbon 
cycle feedback creates uncertainty in the emissions trajectory required to 
achieve a particular stabilisation level.”). 
 122. See generally Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1295 (2009) (identifying ways to reduce the likely backlash 
against regulations of delayed climate change harms); Eric Biber, Climate 
Change, Causation, and Delayed Harm, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 975 (2009) (focus-
ing on how delayed responses shape the climate change debate); Lazarus, su-
pra note 18 (arguing how legislators should insulate climate change legislation 
against short-term concerns).  
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these climate change winners to get behind mitigation policies 
seems an even taller political task than climate policymakers 
have with today’s voters. And regardless of their mitigation pol-
icy positions, people and businesses anticipating a rosier life-
time for themselves and their successors because of climate 
change are likely to demand infrastructure investment and 
other public policies that support the delivery of those bene-
fits.123
The psychological account of public opinion on climate 
change mitigation policy supports these expectations. Even 
without experience of climate change benefits, many people and 
businesses are generally dug in against investing in effective 
mitigation. One factor is biased assimilation of mixed evidence 
about a topic, which leads people to select the evidence that 
strengthens their preconceptions.
 They are also likely to make private investments that 
entrench them in their beneficial climate change future, and 
thus may not take kindly to public policy measures designed to 
unwind those benefits.  
124 Professor Jeff Rachlinski 
has explained why the scientific evidence on climate change is 
sufficiently contested and ambiguous to lead to biased assimila-
tions, which has further polarized peoples’ views.125 People also 
generally exhibit loss aversion, making people “relatively un-
willing to sacrifice benefits they already possess to obtain other 
benefits,”126 particularly when the other benefits are so far 
off.127
For example, numerous studies have shown that people 
will take environmental action if they perceive that there are 
high overall risks from nonaction, that the risks of nonaction 
threaten their personal welfare, or that the benefits of action 
 These and other effects have seriously impeded public 
support for climate change mitigation, and surely could be no 
less in play for climate change winners. 
 
 123. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 370, 381 
(2007) [hereinafter IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY], available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessmen
t_report_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm (describing 
the relationship between climate change and changing infrastructure needs, 
and noting that some major updates are already underway). 
 124. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 304–05. 
 125. See id. at 304–06.  
 126. Id. at 307. 
 127. See generally Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based 
Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 
77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103 (2006).  
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exceed the costs.128 These behavioral trigger conditions are con-
sistent with attitude study findings that “what drives support 
for costly climate change policies is the extent to which citizens 
regard climate change as threatening to their material well-
being.”129 People who do not perceive climate change as threat-
ening their material well-being, but instead see themselves as 
climate change winners, can thus be expected to deliver even 
less support for climate change mitigation. People today also 
say they are not willing to pay much even when their payment 
would assure a solution to climate change,130 so consider how 
much less they would be willing to pay if they believe they are 
climate change winners. In short, if many people in twenty-five 
years believe they are climate change winners, the evidence is 
that they will likely integrate evidence that supports their 
views, be reluctant to jeopardize their benefits, and generally 
not care as much about supporting climate change mitigation 
given their lower levels of perceived risk. Indeed, this exact ef-
fect held true in a study of people in Scotland and Southern 
England, leading to the conclusion that “[s]o long as people 
comprehend climate change as personally beneficial, despite 
identifying it as a problem for the UK as a whole, they are un-
likely to consider the need for personal activities to mitigate 
climate change as important.”131
In areas where such climate change winners are concen-
trated geographically or sectorally—where whole communities 
of people and businesses see themselves as winners or where 
winners are concentrated economically through industry-wide 
ties—what are their political representatives to say in response 
to their positions on climate change mitigation and adaptation? 
How successful will a politician in a winner district, or in a dis-
trict dominated by a winner industry, be by running on a plat-
form supporting aggressive mitigation regulation, with an ex-
clusive focus on harm-reducing adaptation? Given evidence 
that legislators in jurisdictions with high greenhouse gas emis-
  
 
 128. See Zahran et al., supra note 38, at 774. 
 129. Id. at 784. 
 130. One study on willingness to pay found that less than a third of re-
spondents were willing to spend more than $25 per month, even assuming 
such payments when amassed would allow policymakers to “solve” climate 
change. See THOMAS E. CURRY ET AL., LAB. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T, A SURVEY OF 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITI-
GATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSES OF 2006 RESULTS 
19–20 (2007). 
 131. Palutikof et al., supra note 31, at 58. 
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sions tend not to support greenhouse gas regulation 
measures,132 there is every reason to believe that politicians in 
winner districts will actively pursue the interests of their con-
stituents. Clearly, therefore, the emergence of climate change 
winners and their concentration in many political districts will 
present new kinds of political struggles for climate policy as 
legislators from expected winner and loser districts are unlikely 
to agree easily on local, state, regional, and national policy di-
rections.133
These effects are complicated even further by the fact that 
who and where the climate change winners are will shift over 
time. Most studies that bother to include benefits in the analy-
sis “point to initial benefits of a modest increase in tempera-
ture, followed by losses as temperatures increase further.”
 
134 
This means climate change winners are likely to start emerging 
in large numbers relatively early in the era of climate change 
impacts. But climate change will not stop on the dime to let 
them bask indefinitely in the benefits. For example, farmers in 
one region that begin experiencing lengthening growing sea-
sons may like to have that continue and thus may oppose, or at 
least fail to support, emission regulation efforts. At some point, 
however, rising temperatures, invasive pests, and other side ef-
fects of climate change will turn those winners into climate 
change losers.135 But there will be another set of climate change 
winners to take their places, as other regions begin to benefit 
from continued climate change. It may take many such cycles 
and thus many centuries before rising global temperatures and 
other effects adverse to agriculture outpace the adaptive capac-
ity to secure the flow of benefits in all regions.136
 
 132. See Cragg & Kahn, supra note 
 In short, over 
the next one hundred years climate change winners will likely 
begin to emerge across the landscape, shift gradually around 
the landscape, and demand attention along the way.  
25, passim. 
 133. See Johnston, supra note 11, at 41–42. 
 134. TOL, supra note 13, at 9 (based on a synthesis of numerous economic 
studies). 
 135. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 12 
(“Many crops show positive responses to elevated carbon dioxide and low levels 
of warming, but higher levels of warming often negatively affect growth and 
yields.”). 
 136. Even then, there might still be businesses and other entities that ben-
efit from climate change indirectly, such as air conditioning and insulation in-
stallation businesses. See supra Part I.B. 
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Adding this shifting winners and losers effect to the al-
ready snarly climate policy scene makes for a rather complex 
mosaic of interests. At any given point in time over the next 
one hundred years and beyond, each person, community, busi-
ness, and industry will have an initial perceived net climate 
impacts starting point—net loser, winner, or neutral—and a 
projected future trajectory of net harms and benefits over their 
relevant planning horizon toward net loser, winner, or neutral. 
How people and businesses view mitigation and adaptation pol-
icy—assuming they act primarily out of self-interest—will de-
pend on how they perceive their respective present and future 
climate change impacts profile, and how they perceive different 
mitigation and adaptation policies will affect that profile. For 
example, a person with a net losing starting point but increas-
ingly net positive trajectory might increasingly oppose public 
investment in mitigation, or at best not actively support it, but 
at the same time enthusiastically support ramped up invest-
ments in adaptation measures designed to secure the anticipat-
ed benefits stream. By contrast, a business that is a net winner 
at one point in time but projects an increasingly losing trajecto-
ry is more likely to increase its support for mitigation and sup-
port immediate investment in infrastructure both to secure the 
present benefits and to avoid the future harms.  
To be sure, not all winners will be in lockstep opposition to 
mitigation policy and myopically focus on benefit-securing ad-
aptation. Although I have assumed self-interested behavior, it 
is of course true that people define their interests in many dif-
ferent ways. A winner might support mitigation policy because 
of an overriding political affiliation, for example, or may sup-
port harm-reducing adaptation out of altruistic motives. Some 
winners might even support mitigation in the belief they can 
lock in a beneficial climate regime in a few decades. My point is 
not to pigeonhole people and businesses, but to draw attention 
to the likelihood that the emergence of classes of climate 
change winners and losers is likely to make climate policy far 
more contested than it already is. Given the evidence that peo-
ple tend to base their climate policy positions on, among other 
things, their perceptions of their climate change impacts pro-
files, as real harms and benefits become widespread, the cli-
mate change winners are likely, on average, to lend less sup-
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port to mitigation policy and more support to benefit-securing 
adaptation policy.137
There are several important observations to be made about 
this policy dynamic.
  
138
At any point in time, in other words, people and their 
communities, businesses and their industries, and political dis-
tricts at all scales will be distributed in various climate change 
impacts profiles, and twenty-five or fifty years later the config-
uration could be much different. Moreover, all of these effects 
are equally true for climate change losers, and for everyone in 
between, which means that the political landscape on climate 
policy will become increasingly patchy, dynamic, and potential-
ly quite volatile.  
 First, it does not apply only to the scale 
of individual people and businesses. As explained above, direct 
climate change benefits are likely to concentrate in areas of bi-
ophysical change, which means that whole communities may 
self-identify as winners. It is likely, in other words, that some 
local and even state political districts will on the whole flip into 
net winner status. Second, even at the individual person and 
business scale, it matters for the politics who they are. Some 
people and businesses will profit immensely from climate 
change, and thus may exert disproportional influence on local, 
state, or federal policymakers to pursue their policy interests. 
Third, it may not take much net movement into winner status 
to make a person or business feel like a winner. In other words, 
it may take only a slight tip in the balance for a person, busi-
ness, or community to start thinking like a climate change 
winner. Finally, some individuals, towns, regions, states, busi-
nesses, and industries will change status over time, while oth-
ers remain relatively static.  
 
 137. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terror-
ism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 525 (2007) (“[I]f Americans 
doubt the risk of serious harm [from climate change], they might well resist 
significant or costly regulatory responses.”). 
 138. My focus is primarily on attitudes toward mitigation and adaptation 
policy. It is entirely possible that climate change winners also will be more 
likely than losers to resist or ignore government efforts to change behaviors 
associated with greenhouse gas emissions, either because they engage in more 
consumptive behavior or simply care less about the effects of their emissions 
footprints. This could complicate strategies to leverage a “behavioral wedge” 
approach to mitigation, through which relatively simple and nonintrusive 
changes in personal and business behavior can significantly reduce aggregate 
emissions. See Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behav-
ioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 18452, 18452–55 (2009).  
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This is clearly not the linear “loser only” scenario one finds 
repeated in climate change policy studies and legal scholarship. 
The point should be clear by now: over the next one hundred 
years, climate change winners and losers of all sorts will begin 
to emerge and shift around across the landscape. Who they are, 
where they are, and how prevalent they are in any region will 
shift continually across time and space. There is little chance 
that this dynamic will not influence climate change politics.  
The question that motivates this Article, therefore, is: 
What will the conversation sound like when the losers and the 
winners in countless urban and rural communities around the 
nation meet at coffee shops and water coolers and the topic of 
climate change comes up? I do not purport to have any superior 
insight into the psychology behind where and when people, 
communities, businesses, industries, and political jurisdictions 
place themselves in the winner versus loser matrix, or how 
they engage the policy debate given where they land. It is diffi-
cult to conceive of a future in which no such entities believe 
they are climate change winners, and it is naïve to assume all 
those who do consider themselves winners will stay in line with 
the themes of aggressive mitigation and harm-reducing adapta-
tion. As Richard Lazarus aptly alluded to in his impressive 
analysis of the current state of climate change politics: 
The potential for short-term benefits from climate change in nations 
like the United States will fuel other climate change lawmaking skep-
tics. Those who believe they have something to gain, whether from 
predictions of enhanced agricultural productivity or access to new en-
ergy resources, will be naturally reluctant to join a coalition favoring 
climate change legislation.139
What will we do about the climate change winners among 
us then? Of course, whatever we do about winners, we should 
not necessarily be concerned about a future full of climate 
change winners now.  
  
B. WHY WORRY NOW ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS? 
There is every reason to believe that as actual and prospec-
tive climate change winner and loser status becomes more tan-
gible, winners and losers will begin to place contested demands 
on mitigation and adaptation policies. Yet the consequence of 
stifling talk of climate change winners is that climate policy 
has no theory of what to do about their presence in this policy 
dynamic. Legal scholars have acted as if the future includes on-
 
 139. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1185. 
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ly climate change losers who will actively support aggressive 
mitigation and harm-reducing adaptation once they perceive 
they are losers, and thus have focused only on whether and 
how to achieve those climate change policies. But if at any 
point in time fifty million or more people, tens of thousands or 
more businesses, and thousands or more communities and po-
litical units in the United States believe they and the people of 
the future they care most about would be better off were cli-
mate change to continue its course, one has to expect that they 
will place demands on policy that may not be consonant with 
aggressive mitigation and harm-reducing adaptation policies. 
Clearly, climate policy must focus on those who will suffer un-
der climate change, but what should we do about the climate 
change winners? Climate policy has not openly considered this 
question—it has formulated no answer for what to say if sub-
stantial numbers of climate change winners throughout the na-
tion demand that policy focus on retaining or enhancing the 
benefits they expect to enjoy as a result of climate change. 
To be sure, climate policy has had to deal openly with the 
sacrifices some people will have to make under an aggressive 
mitigation regime, such as through higher energy prices or 
shifting employment opportunities.140 The standard policy re-
sponse has been that any such sacrifices are morally, if not also 
economically, justified to make now to avoid far more serious 
harms to future generations.141 More optimistically, policymak-
ers trumpet the prospect of green jobs and other positive eco-
nomic spinoffs of a climate change mitigation regime as soften-
ing the impacts of regulation to present and near-term 
generations.142 The debate over these policy tradeoffs is already 
in full gear in legal scholarship, to be sure.143
 
 140. See generally NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
THE STERN REVIEW (2007) (comprehensively studying costs and benefits of 
climate change mitigation policies such as regulation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions); Bruce A. Babcock, Costs and Benefits to Agriculture from Climate 
Change Policy, IOWA AG REV., Summer 2009, at 1 (focusing on impacts of dif-
ferent regulatory policies on agricultural sector). 
  
 141. See generally Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate 
Change and Future Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097 (2011) (parsing out 
common justifications for intergenerational discounting and arguing that 
morally, people should value future generations as highly as they do their 
own). 
 142. See Dorceta E. Taylor, Green Jobs and the Potential to Diversify the 
Environmental Workforce, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 47 (2011) (“At the apo-
gee of the 2008 election cycle not a day passed without mention of green jobs 
or green collar workers.”); see, e.g., THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., GREEN 
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But this is not the tradeoff problem I am suggesting the 
policy world and legal scholars have yet to confront in any co-
herent way. It is one thing that greenhouse gas emission regu-
lations may cause some people alive today to lose their “brown” 
jobs while others gain more lucrative “green” employment. The 
focus of climate policy has been whether to pursue regulation to 
avoid making people alive in the future worse off because of 
climate change—to limit the number of climate change losers. 
Doing so requires making (or forcing) changes in present be-
havior that will inevitably make some people in the near term 
worse off and some better off compared to their lot under the 
status quo. They are made worse or better off not because of 
climate change, however, but because of present policy choices 
made to influence future climate change trends and impacts. 
The phenomenon I am concerned with has to do with peo-
ple, businesses, and communities in the future believing they 
have been made better off because of climate change, not be-
cause of climate change policy. Few today would claim to be 
this kind of climate change winner, because there have not 
been enough climate change impacts in the United States to 
make anyone feel as if it has made them much better or worse 
off.144
 
JOBS: A PATHWAY TO A STRONG MIDDLE CLASS, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
assets/documents/mctf_one_staff_report_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) 
(providing information about climate change policies including green jobs  
impacts). 
 The issue, therefore, has not been put into play. In fifty 
years, however, there may be many millions of people and 
thousands of businesses and communities who begin finding or 
anticipating sufficient benefits from climate change to think of 
 143. See generally, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss et al., Green Jobs Myths, 16 MO. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 326 (2009) (challenging arguments that a green jobs 
economy will develop and will, among other things, offset costs of greenhouse 
gas regulation); Jason Scott Johnston, Global Warming Advocacy Science: A 
Cross Examination (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Pa-
per No. 10-08, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612851 (challeng-
ing arguments for stronger mitigation regulation).  
 144. When asked to respond to the statement “I have personally experi-
enced the effects of global warming,” over two-thirds of 1010 adult Americans 
surveyed in 2010 disagreed at least somewhat. LEISEROWITZ, BELIEFS AND 
ATTITUDES, supra note 107, at 18. Neither this question nor any other in the 
survey asked respondents to differentiate between beneficial and harmful ef-
fects, but rather only focused on the harmful effects. See id. Similarly, only 
twenty-seven percent of adults asked the same question in a county-wide 
study agreed, with over one-third of respondents strongly or somewhat disa-
greeing and over one third undecided. Akerlof et al., supra note 101, at 3. 
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themselves as winners. Like most winners, many of them will 
want to stay winners.  
So why have legal scholars devoted no attention to what to 
do about climate change winners? Perhaps one reason not to 
bother thinking about climate change winners is that there are 
not many out there yet and we can begin worrying about their 
policy positions when they begin expressing them. This logic 
falls apart, however, considering that there are not many cli-
mate change losers out there yet either. Climate change has on-
ly just begun to take sufficient hold to allow identification of 
harms and benefits, meaning the policy rationales necessarily 
are focused on impacts to future generations. Why would the 
prospect of future generations of losers be the reason for policy 
to attend to their interests now, but the prospect of future gen-
erations of winners would be the reason for policy not to ac-
count for them now? Clearly, if we are going to ignore the cli-
mate change winners problem, there has to be more reason for 
it than because they are off in the future. Otherwise, we should 
also be ignoring the climate change losers problem. 
One such reason to ignore climate change winners but not 
losers could be that, simply put, they are winners, not losers. 
No matter how large in number, their gains are windfalls made 
possible only because of a phenomenon causing suffering to 
others. Like those who benefit from war or natural disasters, 
therefore, we should not countenance any demands by them to 
lock in their gains by allowing climate change to persist or to 
stabilize at levels adverse to large populations. To be sure, 
some people may be unappealing climate change winners be-
cause they seek economic opportunity in climate change—for 
example, someone who builds seawalls may do a brisk business 
in coastal areas or someone who moves from one area to anoth-
er to seek better conditions. But many climate change winners 
will benefit more passively, such as a farmer whose crops thrive 
because of a longer growing season, and many climate change 
winners will be people whose lives may improve just barely 
above subsistence levels thanks to the extra water or warmth 
climate change provides. It will be difficult, therefore, to lump 
the climate change winners into the same category as war prof-
iteers and post-hurricane price gougers. Indeed, it is likely that 
many climate change winners will present sympathetic cases, 
or at least be seen as acting reasonably. 
Another possible basis for ignoring climate change winners 
could be that they will be too few in number, especially when 
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compared to the number of climate change losers, to present 
much of a policy influence. But we do not know that. Indeed, 
the focus of most policy analyses has been on the adverse im-
pacts of climate change, with very little effort devoted to model-
ing climate change benefits or identifying locations and num-
bers of likely beneficiaries.145
Nevertheless, even if climate change winners appear in 
large numbers and many present sympathetic cases, another 
possible argument for discounting their presence is that in all 
likelihood their aggregate numbers and benefits will nonethe-
less be much smaller compared to the aggregate numbers and 
harms of climate change losers, so they will not alter the cost-
benefit analysis of climate policy options by enough to worry 
about. But we also do not know that,
 The potential of there being large 
numbers of climate change winners distributed widely 
throughout the nation thus cannot be discounted. 
146 and we certainly cannot 
say how much smaller the winners’ bounty will be compared to 
the losers’ losses, even if in general that appears likely to be the 
case. Regardless, even knowing with certainty that the number 
of winners and their aggregate benefits will be substantially 
smaller than the number of losers and their aggregate harms is 
not a good reason for policy to ignore the winners; indeed, it is a 
reason to pay close attention to them. As explained above, cli-
mate change winners may be concentrated in areas sufficient to 
allow them to take over the climate policy of local or state polit-
ical districts, and even if outnumbered by losers some political-
ly and economically powerful climate change winners, particu-
larly businesses aligned in winner industries, may find their 
benefits highly valuable and thus worth fighting for aggressive-
ly.147
 
 145. See Johnston, supra note 
 Hence, even if only a minority nationally and with less at 
stake in the aggregate, climate change winners may be quite 
vocal and aggressive in their efforts to secure their benefits and 
11, at 42 (complaining that climate policy 
reports offered in support of greenhouse gas regulation generally ignore the 
cost-benefit analyses contained in economic studies); Mendelsohn, supra note 
7, at 44 (complaining that the influential Stern Report considered only harm-
ful effects of climate change in calculating the costs and benefits of greenhouse 
gas emission regulation).  
 146. See TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that the positive externalities of 
climate change have not been quantified); supra Part I.A.1 (cautioning that 
few robust studies have been conducted on how much losers will lose and win-
ners will win in certain areas of climate change). 
 147. See Cragg & Kahn, supra note 25, passim; Johnston, supra note 11, at 
41–42. 
  
254 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:206 
 
may be successful in many local, state, and even federal  
quarters. 
Perhaps the ultimate explanation for not considering what 
to do about climate change winners is that extrapolating un-
checked climate change trends far enough into the future leads 
to global oblivion. In the final analysis, in other words, if cli-
mate change is not put under control there are only climate 
change losers. Whether true or not, any such climate change 
apocalypse would be a long way off,148 and it does not mean 
there will not be climate change winners along the way, many 
of whom might not take the long view. After all, notwithstand-
ing the possibility of climate change oblivion, many people and 
businesses today aggressively resist and even attack green-
house gas regulations in legal forums.149
The response might be that climate change winners will be 
more magnanimous global citizens than people today who are 
opposed to greenhouse gas regulations, because they will know 
that climate change is real, is a bad thing for humanity on the 
whole, and is the source of their individual gains. In other 
words, out of either a moral commitment or a fear of shaming, 
they will do the right thing. At the very least, it would be hard 
to be a climate change winner and a climate change skeptic at 
the same time, so one would not expect climate change winners 
to deny climate change as the source of their benefits.
 Why should we plan 
policy around the expectation that the climate change winners 
of the future will behave any differently, particularly as they 
will have anticipated, experienced, and even become accultur-
ated to tangible benefits from climate change? 
150
 
 148. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 
 It 
would be monumentally naïve, however, to assume a wholesale 
norm transformation in the future as the basis for ignoring the 
climate change winners policy problem in the present. Many 
people work in or benefit from industries known to produce 
harmful products or effects, and many of them aggressively re-
2, at 44–47 (discussing im-
pacts through and beyond the twenty-first century under different emissions 
scenarios). 
 149. See David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate 
Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 15, 70–85 (2012) (describing the significant component of climate change 
litigation challenging government mitigation initiatives).  
 150. Though, even a climate change winner aware of the source of his or 
her benefits could rationalize that climate change is a completely natural phe-
nomenon and thus resistance to greenhouse gas regulation is justified as con-
trolling emissions will have no effect on climate.  
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sist regulation of the industry. Why assume that beneficiaries 
of climate change will not behave the same way? Particularly 
as climate change winners begin to invest in and build their 
lives around the stream of benefits climate change provides 
them, it is likely that many will not easily be persuaded to let 
go of thinking like winners even when reminded of the source 
of their bounty. 
Possibly, however, the idea is that even accepting all of the 
foregoing, talking about climate change winners will prompt 
people to think about whether they are winners, and if they de-
cide they are then to act like winners. Keeping a lid on the topic 
thus may be more constructive to mitigation and adaptation 
policy goals than talking openly about it.151
A final possible reason for why legal scholars are not dis-
cussing climate change winners is more personal—that doing 
so might make one appear to be downplaying the magnitude of 
climate change harms and the importance of implementing an 
aggressive mitigation policy. Indeed, it might even be seen as 
giving ammunition to opponents of greenhouse gas regulation 
who will argue that the cost-benefit analysis case for regulation 
suffers once climate change benefits are robustly examined and 
factored in. But this is the worst reason of all to sidestep the is-
sue. Refusing to confront the climate change winner problem 
because of appearances, or because of how opponents of climate 
mitigation measures might distort the message, will only as-
sure that there is no policy in place when climate change win-
ners begin to emerge in significant numbers. Indeed, until re-
cently climate policy dialogue took the head-in-the-sand 
approach with respect to climate change adaptation, making it 
taboo to speak of adaptation of any kind—even on behalf of 
helping climate change losers—out of fear that a growing confi-
dence in adaptive capacity might deflect focus away from estab-
lishing effective mitigation policies.
 The evidence sum-
marized above, however, suggests that people and businesses 
already are on to the potential for climate change benefits even 
with nary a word about the topic from official sources. Contin-
ued official silence about climate change benefits thus seems no 
more likely to keep people from concluding they may be win-
ners once the benefits start coming on line.  
152
 
 151. See O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 
 No wonder that mention 
14, at 99 
(discussing this position). 
 152. E. Lisa F. Schipper and Ian Burton sum up the tension that existed 
through the 1990s and well into the following decade:  
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of possible climate change benefits has been buried deep in offi-
cial climate change assessments in fleeting and highly qualified 
terms.153 It is just not something anyone seems to want to dis-
cuss. But just as delayed attention to adaptation has left adap-
tation policy in deficit mode,154
Perhaps raising the topic of climate change winners will 
not win one many green points, but the bottom line is that ig-
noring climate change winners will not make them go away or 
behave selflessly. Their emergence will present a potentially 
complex policy issue that legal scholars should take into ac-
count now. In fifty years there may be tens of millions of people 
and thousands of businesses and communities in the United 
States considering themselves climate change winners and 
pushing on their political representatives to serve their inter-
ests.
 so too would delaying attention 
to climate change winners leave policy unprepared once they 
begin to emerge in numbers across the landscape. By then it 
may be too late to establish effective legal principles for manag-
ing the demands they place on mitigation and adaptation  
policies. 
155
 
[I]nterest in adaptation was overwhelmed by concern about the need 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and stabilize atmospheric green-
house gas concentrations. Proponents of adaptation faced two obsta-
cles that were attributed to adaptation: reducing the apparent need 
for mitigation; and playing down the urgency for action. For one, 
“adaptationists” were distrusted because their proposals seemed to 
undermine the need for mitigation. Critics felt that belief in the po-
tential value of adaptation would soften the resolve of governments to 
grasp the nettle of mitigation and thus play into the hands of the fos-
sil fuels interests and the climate change sceptics. In addition, be-
cause climate change was popularly perceived as a gradual process, 
adaptation was not considered urgent as there would be time to adapt 
when climate change and its impacts became manifest. These views 
dominated in the mid and late 1990s.  
 Hence, whereas climate policy of the present is about 
how much to sacrifice now to limit the number of climate 
change losers of the future, the climate policy of the not too dis-
tant future will be made far more complex by the emergence of 
a class of climate change winners, many of whom will have the 
E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton, Understanding Adaptation: Origins, Con-
cepts, Practice and Policy, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 7 (E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton eds., 2009). 
 153. See supra note 9.  
 154. See Ian Burton, Climate Change and the Adaptation Deficit, in THE 
EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 152, at 
89, 91–92. 
 155. See generally O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14 
(explaining the likely emergence of climate change winners). 
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interest and wherewithal to influence the direction of policy 
toward keeping their flows of benefits intact.  
So, now that we know there will be substantial numbers of 
people and businesses self-identifying as climate change win-
ners and that their emergence will present complex and con-
tested policy demands, what should we do about it and how do 
we do it? The remainder of the Article turns to this question 
and its related normative and positive dimensions for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation policies. 
IV.  MITIGATION POLICY: IGNORE CLIMATE CHANGE 
WINNERS   
The mitigation policy I have used as the reference point for 
this Article is the pursuit of aggressive greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions. The United States has achieved little traction 
toward that goal as things stand today, and the emergence of 
climate change winners in the near future portends an increas-
ingly complex and contested policy landscape. So what steps 
could policymakers take now to limit the disruptive effects of 
the climate change winner phenomenon on mitigation policy? 
In this section I argue that the most effective policy measure 
will be to ignore climate change winners. I say “ignore them” 
not in the sense used thus far in the Article of ignoring their 
presence, which we should not do, but rather in the sense of ig-
noring their benefits when formulating mitigation policy, which 
we should do. In other words, mitigation policy should ignore 
climate change winners not by default, but by design.  
Many economists focused on producing a robust cost-
benefit efficiency analysis for climate change mitigation policy 
are likely to object, but there are compelling reasons for sup-
porting a mitigation policy approach that focuses principally on 
achieving long-term cost-effectiveness and thus purposively 
leaves valuation of climate change benefits (and harms) out of 
the policy choice equation. An IAM-style cost-benefit approach 
weighs the costs and benefits of stabilizing the climate under 
different regulatory options, thus requiring the contentious 
process of assessing and valuing future climate change harms 
and benefits and also future mitigation policy harms and bene-
fits.156
 
 156. Richard D. Morgenstern, Critiquing the Critique of the Climate 
Change Winner Argument, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10720, 10720 (2011). 
 By contrast, a cost-effectiveness approach adopts a polit-
ically determined “long run target for limiting the amount of 
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projected climate change or atmospheric [greenhouse gas] ac-
cumulations, and focuses on what policy trajectory might 
achieve alternative goals at minimum economic cost.”157
The question of which approach to use is already a matter 
of intense debate in climate policy,
 The 
latter approach does not employ assessment of harms or bene-
fits—it focuses exclusively on the costs of achieving the legisla-
tively-mandated policy target.  
158 without any attention giv-
en to climate change winners. The critique of relying primarily 
on the cost-effectiveness approach is that the legislatively-
mandated targets “must come from somewhere,” and that one 
of the relevant sources informing that choice necessarily is cost-
benefit analysis.159 The critique of relying primarily on cost-
benefit analysis for mitigation policy, besides its underlying 
normative assumptions about the virtues of efficiency, is that it 
is extraordinarily unwieldy. A multitude of factors must be in-
tegrated into a comprehensive analysis, and there is not much 
certainty about many of them; across the plethora of such stud-
ies conducted to date “there are huge differences about the size 
of market and nonmarket damages, and the expected cata-
strophic risks.”160
The difference between these two approaches will be ampli-
fied as tangible climate change harms and benefits begin to 
come on line. On the one hand, cost-effectiveness methodology 
will be unaffected, as it does not incorporate assessment of 
harms and benefits. By contrast, IAM-style cost-benefit analy-
sis will become more complex as direct and indirect harms and 
benefits become more prevalent, albeit measuring them will re-
ly less on modeled predictions and more on empirical data. The 
problem with the IAM approach, however, is just that—we will 
be able to measure climate change benefits and thus IAM mod-
els, to be accurate, will have to incorporate them. There are two 
reasons for concern in this respect. One is the need to avoid the 
short term from locking the long term into a social trap. The 
other reason, which is uniquely pronounced in the climate 
change context, is the need to hedge against nonlinearities, tip-
  
 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Dowlatabadi, supra note 6, at 291 (identifying the choice of cost-
benefit versus cost-effectiveness as a threshold question). 
 159. See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, A Reply, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10726, 10726 (2011). 
 160. Morgenstern, supra note 156, at 10721. 
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ping points, and risk profiles that complicate the physical and 
economic future of climate change.  
A. AVOIDING THE CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS SOCIAL TRAP 
A social trap is commonly defined as “any situation in 
which the short-run, local reinforcements guiding individual 
behavior are inconsistent with the long-run, global best interest 
of the individual and society.”161 Classic examples include the 
small-scale prisoner’s dilemma game and the large-scale trage-
dy of the commons.162 Many environmental problems find their 
root cause in social traps,163 and climate change is sizing up to 
be one of unprecedented dimension.164
Several bait factors can set the trap leading to disconnects 
between short-term behavior reinforcement and desired long-
term outcome,
 
165 all of which are in play in the climate change 
scenario. For example, time delay between costs and benefits 
can result in short-term policy focusing on only one side of the 
ledger, which Eric Biber has shown to be a significant factor in 
the backlash against mitigation policy as people today are un-
willing to spend for the benefits of mitigation not experienced 
until well into the future.166 General ignorance about the con-
nection between short-term behavior and long-term outcome, 
such as widespread lack of understanding about how fossil fuel 
combustion leads to climate change and what the actual risks 
of climate change are, can also lead to social traps.167 A sliding 
reinforcer trap occurs when initial desirable outcomes of a cer-
tain behavior produce a positive feedback leading to oversupply 
of the behavior, such as how the benefits of consuming widely 
available, low-cost fossil fuels lead to more and more consump-
tion.168
 
 161. Robert Costanza, Social Traps and Environmental Policy, 37 BIOSCI-
ENCE 407, 408 (1987). For seminal works on social trap theory, see J.G. CROSS 
& MELVIN J. GUYER, SOCIAL TRAPS (1980), and John Platt, Social Traps, 28 
AM. PSYCHOL. 641 (1973). 
 An externality trap occurs when, as in the prisoner’s di-
 162. Costanza, supra note 161, at 408–09 (explaining how both these ex-
amples fit the social trap model). 
 163. See id. at 407–08 (giving examples). 
 164. See Rachlinski, supra note 124, at 300 (describing social traps through 
cognitive psychology theories and concluding that “[o]ne can scarcely find a 
contemporary problem that better fits the definition of a social trap than glob-
al climate change”). 
 165. See Costanza, supra note 161, at 408–09 (taxonomy of social traps). 
 166. See Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, supra note 122. 
 167. See Costanza, supra note 161, at 408–09. 
 168. See id. 
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lemma game, individuals mistakenly believe they can pass the 
costs of their behavior onto others, only to find they suffer the 
consequences as well, which amply describes how nations are 
approaching global solutions to climate change.169 Finally, a col-
lective trap occurs when, as in the tragedy of the commons, in-
dividually rational short-term behavior leads to long-term col-
lective downfall, which is quite obviously at the root of the 
climate change problem.170
Now consider how much more reinforcement climate 
change winners would inject into these climate change social 
traps as they weigh in on climate policy. First, by focusing at-
tention on their short-term gains they further dissociate cur-
rent policy from future outcomes (time delay trap). Second, 
their focus on current benefits exhibits ignorance about how 
benefits are likely over the long run to shift around and even-
tually diminish over the landscape (ignorance trap). Third, by 
pointing to benefits of climate change they suggest that more 
benefits will follow from more climate change (sliding reinforcer 
trap). Fourth, they act as if the externalities of climate change 
are shared only by the losers, whereas eventually the progres-
sion of climate change will strip them of their own benefits (ex-
ternality trap). Finally, although winners are behaving perfect-
ly rationally in seeking to secure their benefits by scaling back 
mitigation policy, the global long-term result is disastrous (col-
lective trap). 
  
As bad as this appears, the climate change winners social 
trap is particularly devious because it could be baited and set 
subtly through the well-intentioned use of cost-benefit analysis 
in the IAMs that are being employed and debated widely in 
climate policy. Climate change winners will not have to domi-
nate policy-making in order to fuel the climate change social 
trap, but rather need only to succeed in having their benefits 
more robustly defined and incorporated into IAM cost-benefit 
analyses, which is squarely within their interests to advocate. 
The result of doing so for each generation of climate change 
winners will be a cost-benefit outcome which, while likely still 
tilting to the loss side at macro scales, is systematically sof-
tened by the rigorous inclusion of benefits. In other words, the 
policy vector might still be in the direction of adopting mitiga-
tion measures, but the strength of the vector will be weakened 
as climate change benefits are accounted for. 
 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
  
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS 261 
 
Climate change winners will argue that, strictly speaking, 
this weakened mitigation policy vector reflects a more accurate 
cost-benefit analysis. They would be correct, and therein lies 
the social trap. By softening the case for mitigation throughout 
the run of time, climate change winners will incrementally re-
duce the intensity of mitigation policy indefinitely, which in the 
long term is likely to extend climate change. Less mitigation in-
tensity at any point in time means less climate stabilization at 
later points in time, which means a longer time before climate 
stabilizes at acceptable levels.  
The response one might make to this observation is that it 
will all work out over time. In other words, by basing mitiga-
tion policy at all times on robust cost-benefit analysis that ac-
counts for all climate change and mitigation harms and bene-
fits projected from present into the future, climate policy will 
ensure efficiency throughout time and lead to the optimum con-
figuration of greenhouse gas concentrations for the optimum 
climate stabilization profile. If climate does not stabilize over 
time to satisfactory levels, the argument goes, benefits will 
erode and become a less influential factor in the analysis, thus 
justifying more aggressive mitigation measures to get climate 
stabilization back on the right track. This line of reasoning, of 
course, is the underpinning of the “go slow” approach to mitiga-
tion policy,171
There are several serious problems with this reasoning, all 
of which stem from the significant time delays associated with 
climate change. Both climate-destabilizing emissions and cli-
mate-stabilizing emission reductions work their effects over 
long periods of time. To produce reliable policy prescriptions, 
the cost-benefit analysis must be capable of producing accurate 
projections of future cost and benefit profiles of different miti-
gation policy alternatives. The reliability of climate models, 
however, falls off the further out into the future and the small-
er the scale.
 and many climate change winners can be ex-
pected to be all on board with this way of thinking as a justifi-
cation for not supporting mitigation policies.  
172
 
 171. See supra note 
 The long-term end of the cost-benefit analysis, 
therefore, dissolves the more distant the projection horizon. 
7.  
 172. See Kerr, supra note 72, at 173 (explaining the uncertainties in large-
scale models that feed uncertainty into smaller-scale models, such that 
“[s]witching from global models to models focusing on a single region creates a 
more detailed forecast, but it also ‘piles uncertainty on top of uncertainty’”). 
For further explanation of why this is so, see infra Part III.B.2. 
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One technique to make this problem drop out of the picture 
is to set discount rates sufficiently high to make the future ir-
relevant in the cost-benefit analysis, leaving short-term costs 
and benefits as the policy drivers.173 Even a hefty sum of money 
two hundred years into the future is worth very little when dis-
counted to present value using a constant positive compounded 
discount rate. Economist Martin Weitzman has described why 
this “notorious issue of how to discount the distant future”174
The effects of global warming and climate change will be spread out 
over centuries and even millennia from now. The logic of compound-
ing a constant positive interest rate forces us to say that what one 
might conceptualize as monumental—even earth-shaking—events, 
such as disastrous climate change, do not much matter when they oc-
cur in the deep future. Perhaps even more disturbing, when exponen-
tial discounting is extended over very long time periods there is a tru-
ly extraordinary dependence of [cost-benefit analysis] on the choice of 
a discount rate. Seemingly insignificant differences in discount rates 
can make an enormous difference in the present discounted value of 
distant future payoffs. In many long-run situations, almost any an-
swer to a [cost-benefit analysis] question can be defended by one or 
another particular choice of a discount rate. This is true in general, 
but it is an especially acute problem when distant future events like 
climate change (especially catastrophic climate change) are being dis-
counted.
 is 
especially problematic in the climate change policy context: 
175
Even putting aside the practical and ethical problems of 
setting discount rates high enough to paint future generations 
out of the picture,
  
176
 
 173. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 
 this approach has the added flaw of assum-
ing that climate policy can move on a dime and with it so too 
will climate. As experience has demonstrated, however, even in 
141, at 1097 (“[W]hen regulators 
use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the desirability of climate change mitiga-
tion, one factor typically determines whether mitigation is justified: the dis-
count rate, the rate at which future benefits [of mitigation] are converted to 
their present value.”). 
 174. Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Cat-
astrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 275, 283 (2011) [here-
inafter Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty]. 
 175. Id. at 283–84.  
 176. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 141, at 1120–32 (discussing the 
moral implications of discounting the future). Using low discount rates or zero 
rates is not without controversy either. See Dieter Helm, Climate-Change Poli-
cy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 211, 228–
30 (2008) (discussing the ramifications of using low rates); Ferenc L. Toth, 
Discounting in Integrated Assessments of Climate Change, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 
403 (1995) (explaining that using high rates obscures distant losses but using 
low rates would be inconsistent with other policy methods). For these reasons 
“[c]ontroversies involving the discount rate have been central to global warm-
ing models and policy for many years.” Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 43. 
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the event that climate change benefits begin to diminish over 
time in iterations of short-term cost-benefit analyses, moving 
policy in line with shifting projections can be a formidable chal-
lenge. In any case, even if policy can shift quickly to align with 
new cost-benefit analyses, the climate stabilization benefits will 
not be experienced until several generations hence. Saying one 
day that we need to invest more in climate stabilization does 
not produce climate stabilization the next day, or even perhaps 
the next century. 
One might argue in response that as the demand for cli-
mate stabilization increases the market will produce ever more 
effective techniques and technologies capable of making rapid 
adjustments to global climate conditions. Whatever climate ad-
justments cannot be managed on a short-term basis, moreover, 
can be managed through efficient, rapidly deployable adapta-
tion measures. Climate policy, in other words, will begin to look 
like food policy, health care policy, or any other policy, riding 
along on iterations of short-term cost-benefit analyses and rely-
ing on the efficient market and rapid policy responses to make 
the adjustments needed to maintain efficient cost-benefit out-
comes perpetually into the future. There will be minor bumps 
along the way as the need for and implementation of market 
and policy adjustments experience short timing mismatches, 
but on average everything will happen as planned—climate 
will be adjusted at just the right time, to just the right condi-
tions, at just the right cost, forever. The climate change win-
ners social trap is solved!  
Clearly, anyone making these arguments must rely on a 
set of assumptions that, taken together, are fantastical: that 
physical and economic models of climate change allow reliable 
projections well into the future; that discount rates are appro-
priate to apply far into the future; that policy can and will ad-
just quickly as cost-benefit analyses change; that the market 
will produce technologies capable of efficiently and significantly 
shortening the time delay between policy adjustments and cli-
mate stabilization benefits; and that efficient, rapidly deployed 
adaptation measures will manage unavoidable, inefficient 
harms during any residual gap between market and policy ad-
justments and their climate stabilization benefits.177
 
 177. Entertaining these assumptions allows some fascinating thought ex-
periments on how global geopolitics would respond. Given how much interna-
tional friction there is today over climate policy when the benefits of mitiga-
tion efforts might not be felt for centuries, one can imagine how international 
 But let us 
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revel in the sheer arrogance needed to entertain this fiction as 
reality—let us assume all of this could magically come true—
and the social trap remains baited nonetheless. The hitch in 
this argument—and it is a very big hitch—is that it relies on 
the additional assumption that climate change is linear, re-
versible, and conventional in its uncertainty and risk profiles, 
whereas most likely none of these conditions is true.  
B. HEDGING AGAINST NONLINEARITY, TIPPING POINTS, AND 
FAT-TAILED RISKS  
No dose of hubris is enough to overcome the constraints on 
our understanding of climate dynamics as global temperatures 
continue rising. At the global level, one significant limitation 
for modeling projection accuracy is the obvious fact that we 
have no experience with a global climate operating at tempera-
tures like those predicted, and the higher they rise the more 
acute this uncertainty becomes. In short, “[o]nce the world has 
warmed by 4°C, conditions will be so different from anything 
we can observe today (and still more different from the last ice 
age) that it is inherently hard to say when the warming will 
stop.”178
This prediction constraint stems from the observed fact 
that climate change is not linear. Rather, as temperatures rise 
on average, positive and negative feedback effects will eventu-
ally be triggered that could amplify or impede further warming. 
Melting tundra, for example, releases greenhouse gases previ-
ously locked in the frozen formations, and researchers have 
found this effect is far exceeding expected levels because of its 
feedback properties: as the greenhouse gases are released, they 
contribute to warming that melts the tundra faster, which re-
leases more greenhouse gases more rapidly, and so on.
  
179
 
relations would respond if it truly were possible to manipulate the global cli-
mate system over short time frames.  
 The 
 178. Myles R. Allen & David J. Frame, Call Off the Quest, 318 SCIENCE 
582, 582 (2007); see also Benjamin M. Sanderson et al., The Response of the 
Climate System to Very High Greenhouse Gas Emission Scenarios, ENVTL. 
RES. LETTERS, July 5, 2011, at 4–9 (discussing climate responses to unabated 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
 179. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Northern Lakes: 
Present and Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget, 365 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1657, 1671 (2007); K.M. Walter et al., Methane 
Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive Feedback to Climate Warm-
ing, 443 NATURE 71, 71 (2006). This effect is believed to have played a signifi-
cant role in the last deglaciation. See K.M. Walter et al., Thermokarst Lakes as 
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scientific literature exploring these complex dynamics and ex-
posing our lack of understanding about what lies ahead as 
temperature rises is legion,180 and yet still we do not have a 
firm grasp of how the feedback systems will work as tempera-
tures rise.181
Scientists also believe many of these transformations will 
be irreversible once conditions pass thresholds. The melting of 
the tundra, for example, “could be a one-way ticket,” as once 
melted the tundra cannot recompose itself should climate ever 
return former tundra areas to permafrost conditions.
  
182 The 
problem is that while we know there is a high probability of 
crossing such tipping points and venturing irreversibly into 
new climate states, we do not know when we will cross them; in 
fact, we likely will not know until long after that we have 
crossed one.183 That is the nature of environmental nonlinearity 
and tipping points.184
 
a Source of Atmospheric CH4 During the Last Deglaciation, 318 SCIENCE 633, 
633 (2007). 
  
 180. See Robert A. Washington-Allen et al., Introduction to Special Feature 
on Catastrophic Thresholds, Perspectives, Definitions, and Applications, 15 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 38 (2010), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/ 
vol15/iss3/art38. 
 181. See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THRESHOLDS OF CLI-
MATE CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS (Colleen W. Charles ed., 2009), available at 
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-2/final-report/default.htm (ex-
amining numerous positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresh-
olds in climate change dynamics); Almut Arneth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the 
Planet?, 326 SCIENCE 672, 673 (2009) (examining the feedback effects between 
conventional air pollution control and climate change mitigation, concluding 
that complex positive and negative feedback links exist and that, on balance, 
the evidence and models suggest that “[a]ir pollution control will accelerate 
warming in the coming decades”); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate 
Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE 
1444 (2008) (explaining the complex and nonlinear forest-climate interac-
tions); I. Eisenman & J.S. Wettlauferet al., Nonlinear Threshold Behavior 
During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 28 (2009) (de-
scribing the nonlinear “tipping points” in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Je-
rome Gaillardet & Albert Galy, Himalaya—Carbon Sink or Source?, 320 SCI-
ENCE 1727 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of the sinks and sources of the 
carbon geological cycle); Steven W. Running, Ecosystem Disturbance, Carbon, 
and Climate, 321 SCIENCE 652 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of ecologi-
cal sinks and sources such as fires and insect epidemics). 
 182. John Bohannon, The Big Thaw Reaches Mongolia’s Pristine North, 
319 SCIENCE 567, 568 (2008). Researchers believe there is a strong potential 
for similar nonlinear change effects throughout the world’s peatlands. See 
Nancy B. Dise, Peatland Response to Global Change, 326 SCIENCE 810 (2009). 
 183. See generally Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment 
of Tipping Points in the Climate System, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5041 
(2009); Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Points in the Earth’s Climate Sys-
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Moreover, given how severe runaway climate change is 
likely to be for humanity and ecosystems eventually, the uncer-
tainty and risk profiles on the other side of climate tipping 
points are potentially loaded with catastrophic problems that 
defy the conventional bell-shaped probability curves.185 Basical-
ly, we do not really know what will happen, but we do know 
some very bad things could happen. Obviously, such “fat-tailed” 
extreme event probabilities,186
These are distinct aspects of loss distributions, such as damages from 
a disaster or insurance claims. With fat-tailed losses, the probability 
declines slowly, relative to the severity of the loss. Tail dependence is 
that propensity of dependence to concentrate in the tails, such that 
severe losses are more likely to happen together. Micro-correlations 
are negligible correlations between risks which may be individually 
harmless, but very dangerous when aggregated. These three phenom-
ena—types of catastrophic and dependent risks—undermine tradi-
tional approaches to risk management.
 if they are locked in by crossing 
key climate system tipping points, make the consequences of 
getting the policy wrong quite severe. As Carolyn Kousky and 
Roger Cooke of Resources for the Future argue, the greatest 
downside of relying on conventional risk analysis in the climate 
change policy context thus stems from what they describe as 
the “unholy trinity” of fat tails, tail dependence, and micro-
correlations:  
187
 
tem, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1786 (2008); Johan Rockström et al., A Safe 
Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472 (2009). 
  
 184. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., ADVISORY COMM. FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH & 
EDUC., TRANSITIONS AND TIPPING POINTS IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTAL SYS-
TEMS 28–31 (2009), available at http://www.nsf.gov/geo/ere/ereweb/ac-ere/ 
nsf6895_ere_report_090809.pdf. 
 185. See Weitzman, A Review of the Stern Review, supra note 6; Weitzman, 
Fat-Tailed Uncertainty, supra note 174.  
 186. A tail event is an outcome that should happen only extremely infre-
quently given normal probability distributions based on historical event fre-
quencies. As the tail of the probability distribution grows “fatter” the likeli-
hood of a tail event rises. See Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 50. For a concise and 
accessible explanation of fat-tailed risks in climate change policy contexts gen-
erally, see Melinda Kimble & Letha Tawney, The Tale of the Fat Tail, ENVTL. 
F., May–June 2009, at 24. 
 187. Carolyn Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, The Unholy Trinity: Fat Tails, 
Tail Dependence, and Micro-Correlations 1 (Resources for the Future Discus-
sion Paper No. 09-36-REV, 2009). Aggregated micro-correlations have been 
described as leading to the “Jenga effect,” after the game in which players 
stack pieces into a tower and then remove them, one by one, stacking the re-
moved pieces on the top of the tower. With skilled players, the structure can 
stay standing for quite a while, but at some point one more piece removed or 
stacked on top leads to a sudden crash of the entire structure. Food web dy-
namics exhibit this effect. Peter C. de Ruiter et al., Food Web Ecology: Playing 
Jenga and Beyond, 309 SCIENCE 68, 68 (2005).  
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Legal scholars are beginning to recognize the serious chal-
lenges nonlinearity, tipping points, and fat-tailed risk effects in 
the climate change system pose for using IAM cost-benefit 
analysis as our primary climate policy calibration instru-
ment.188 The assumption that cost-benefit analysis can pick up 
on changing climate conditions and seamlessly feed this new 
information into markets and the policy world for rapid correc-
tive responses is, quite simply, blown apart once the prospect of 
crossing unpredictable, irreversible, potentially game-changing 
thresholds is factored into the picture.189
[T]he economics of climate change consists of a very long chain of 
tenuous inferences fraught with big uncertainties in every link: be-
ginning with unknown base-case GHG emissions; compounded by big 
uncertainties about how available policies and policy levers will affect 
actual GHG emissions; compounded by big uncertainties about how 
GHG flow emissions accumulate via the carbon cycle into GHG stock 
concentrations; compounded by big uncertainties about how and 
when GHG stock concentrations translate into global average tem-
perature changes; compounded by big uncertainties about how global 
average temperature changes decompose into specific changes in re-
gional weather patterns; compounded by big uncertainties about how 
adaptations to, and mitigations of, climate change damages at a re-
gional level are translated into regional utility changes via an appro-
priate “damages function”; compounded by big uncertainties about 
how future regional utility changes are aggregated into a worldwide 
utility function and what its overall degree of risk aversion should be; 
compounded by big uncertainties about what discount rate should be 
used to convert everything into expected present discounted values. 
The result of this lengthy cascading of big uncertainties is a reduced 
form of truly extraordinary uncertainty about the aggregate welfare 
impacts of catastrophic climate change, which is represented mathe-
 I cannot sum up this 
problem more concisely and compellingly than Weitzman does 
in his work critiquing IAM-style cost-benefit analysis of climate 
mitigation policy: 
 
 188. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 43–
58 (2004); Daniel H. Cole, The Stern Review and Its Critics: Implications for 
the Theory and Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 53, 
56–57, 77–78 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 926–27 
(2011); Ruhl, supra note 18, at 416–23; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan 
A. Gilligan, Macro-Risks: The Challenge for Rational Risk Regulation, 21 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 401, 402–07 (2011). 
 189. The additional assumption one might make to support using cost-
benefit analysis, that we can “learn that catastrophe is impending fast enough 
to make a sufficiently quick and vigorous global response to head off the possi-
bility,” also seems “excessively optimistic.” Farber, supra note 188, at 943 
n.189.  
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matically by a [probability density function] that is spread out and 
heavy with probability in the tails.190
Hence, resting as it must on the unrealistic set of assump-
tions outlined above and exposing us as it does to tipping points 
the other side of which is a virtual abyss of uncertainty, but 
likely catastrophe, it seems particularly risky to use IAM-style 
cost-benefit analysis as our primary mitigation policy com-
pass.
  
191
 
 190. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty, supra note 
 While I do not profess to know the right global surface 
temperature or atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases 
to set as policy targets, it seems far more prudent to hedge 
against nonlinearity, tipping points, and fat-tailed risks by de-
signing policy goals and time lines through scientific models ra-
174, at 284–85. In his 
survey of IAM models through 2011, Nordhaus observes that “[t]here has been 
virtually no work applying Weitzman’s insights in empirical IAMs.” Nordhaus, 
supra note 6, at 50. Since Nordhaus’s assessment, however, researchers at the 
Center for Robust Decision Making on Climate and Energy Policy have devel-
oped dynamic IAM models integrating stochastic tipping point parameters for 
climate change based on climate experts’ subjective opinions about the likeli-
hood of various climate tipping point catastrophes, such as changes in the 
North Atlantic thermo-haline circulation or massive permafrost melting. See 
Thomas S. Lontzek et al., Tipping Points in a Dynamic Stochastic IAM 3, 6–11 
(RDCEP Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1992660. They consider their dynamic stochastic modeling approach “inevi-
table for an appropriate analysis of abrupt climate change with permanent 
and significant damage over a large time horizon.” Id. at 13.  
 191. It is, of course, possible that the analytic capacity of IAM models can 
be vastly improved. However, they necessarily will have to rely on modeler 
opinion (or the modeler’s interpretation of other expert opinions) for defining 
when tipping points will occur, what triggers them, and what lies on the other 
side. See Lontzek, supra note 190, at 6–9 (explaining the use of expert elicita-
tion to calibrate the likelihood, damage, and permanence of tipping point ca-
tastrophes in an IAM model using dynamic stochastic methods). Having never 
experienced a climate system like the one such IAMs must model, however, 
researchers have little to go on. For example, ecologists now warn of the no-
analog future—ecological variability unprecedented in the history of ecology, 
riddled with nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously unknown 
emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change. Matthew C. 
Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution 
Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSER-
VATION 2255, 2255 (2009) (“By 2100, a quarter or more of the Earth’s land sur-
face may experience climatic conditions that have no modern analog . . . .”); 
Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007) 
(“[I]f the climate changes over the next 100 years as current models predict, 
surviving species throughout much of Earth’s land area . . . are likely to be re-
shuffled into novel ecosystems unknown today.”); Douglas Fox, When Worlds 
Collide, CONSERVATION, Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 28–30 (arguing that it is likely 
that the world will enter into a no-analog future within 100–200 years). If 
there is no scientific basis for reliably describing a future scenario that lies on 
the other side of climate tipping points, there is nothing reliably to plug into 
an IAM. 
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ther than through economic models, at which time cost-
effectiveness analysis should guide how we go about achieving 
those targets. 
V.  ADAPTATION POLICY: EMBRACE CLIMATE CHANGE 
WINNERS   
The adaptation policy I have used as the reference point for 
this Article is one of pursuing harm-preventing adaptive 
measures. Unlike the mitigation policy analysis, however, ad-
aptation policy should work in just the opposite direction to 
embrace rather than ignore winners’ interests. The distribution 
of climate change harms and benefits will shift around the 
landscape gradually over the next several centuries, meaning 
benefits will be relatively stable in a given area for relevant 
personal and public infrastructure planning horizons. For ex-
ample, an agricultural area enjoying longer growing seasons 
and beneficial increased precipitation may seek to invest in ir-
rigation and drainage infrastructure, or a shipping business 
benefitting from improved transport routes in the Arctic may 
demand public investment in improved navigation infrastruc-
ture.192 In all likelihood the time frame for investment, con-
struction, use, and depletion of such infrastructure investments 
often will fit within the relevant time frames of the rise and 
possible eventual erosion of the associated climate benefits.193 
Where that is the case, there are strong adaptation policy rea-
sons to facilitate private and public investment in infrastruc-
ture designed to harness and deliver climate change benefits 
that reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to climate 
change harms.194
Adaptation to climate change impacts will leverage these 
two different but closely related strategies focused on deflecting 
  
 
 192. See Ho, supra note 50, at 714–15 (explaining that enabling vessels to 
take advantage of new routes opening up in the melting Arctic will require 
improved capacities in local environmental monitoring and forecasting, search 
and rescue, and traffic routing, as well as in ship technology). 
 193. See generally IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 
123 (describing the relationship between climate change and changing infra-
structure needs, and noting that some major updates are already underway). 
 194. Vulnerability refers to “[t]he degree to which a system is susceptible 
to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate 
variability and extremes,” and resilience refers to “[a] capability to anticipate, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from significant multihazard threats with 
minimum damage to social well-being, the economy, and the environment.” 
INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 2.  
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and recovering from the blows of climate change.195 Many hu-
man communities and ecological landscapes will require a mix 
of these strategies to make effective use of available technologi-
cal, financial, human, social, and natural adaptation capital,196
A. VULNERABILITY-REDUCING BENEFITS  
 
and many benefit-securing adaptation measures would con-
tribute to both strategies. Helping climate change winners se-
cure their benefits, in other words, can help climate change los-
ers as well.  
Vulnerability to climate change harms can be reduced by 
improving the reliability of infrastructure and other mecha-
nisms designed to shield human communities and ecosystems 
from the harmful effects of climate change, such as by con-
structing sea walls to protect coastal areas or limiting new de-
velopment permits on coasts likely to experience sea level 
rise.197
Investment in benefit-securing adaptations can support 
vulnerability-reducing policies. Some infrastructure supporting 
climate change winners, such as improved water management 
systems in areas where some people and businesses will benefit 
 If the risks associated with vulnerability can be reduced 
through such methods, less harm will be sustained and less 
capital will need to be deployed to recover from the effects of 
climate change. 
 
 195. See IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 123, at 
720 (“Adaptation to climate change takes place through adjustments to reduce 
vulnerability or enhance resilience in response to observed or expected chang-
es in climate and associated extreme weather events.”); John Handmer & Ste-
phen Dovers, A Typology of Resilience: Rethinking Institutions for Sustainable 
Development, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE, supra note 152, at 187, 196 (“These two approaches are best seen as 
extremes; in a complex society there is likely to be—and should be—a mixture 
of the two in any given situation and across institutions.”); Nathan Hultman, 
Worth More than Good Advice: Lessons of Hurricane Katrina for Development 
in a Changing Climate, 11 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 47, 49–50 (2005–06) (noting 
several concrete adaptation strategies that have been gleaned from the exam-
ple of Hurricane Katrina).  
 196. Blending the two strategies together is often described under the label 
of “adaptive capacity.” See, e.g., IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, 
supra note 123, at 727–30; Brian H. Hurd, Challenges of Adapting to a Chang-
ing Climate, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77, 81 (2007–08). 
 197. See, e.g., JONATHAN ENSOR & RACHEL BERGER, UNDERSTANDING CLI-
MATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES 
13–16, 164–65 (2009); P. Mick Kelly & W. Neil Adger, Theory and Practice in 
Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change and Facilitating Adaptation, in 
THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 
152, at 161, 162–74. 
  
2012] CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS 271 
 
from increased precipitation, can help protect other people in 
the area who might face risks such as flooding. Focusing just on 
the flooding risk might result in less effective responses than 
would be the case were the policy designed to capitalize as well 
on the benefits. For one thing, climate change winners are more 
likely to support such projects where at least some of the effect, 
intentional or incidental, is to secure them their benefits. 
Moreover, facilitating the delivery and security of climate 
change benefits can strengthen local economies, providing a 
deeper and more secure base from which to finance vulnerabil-
ity-reducing adaptations. Indeed, as winners and losers may of-
ten live side-by-side in many communities, the winners’ pros-
perity could incidentally enhance local capacity for investment 
in vulnerability-reducing adaptations. Climate change winners 
are only winners on net—they will not be immune to all of the 
adverse effects of climate change and thus will support vulner-
ability-reducing adaptations that protect their communities. 
In short, if farmers in an area experiencing longer growing 
seasons and more favorable precipitation regimes will not be 
able to take advantage of those benefits without improved wa-
ter management infrastructure, or if shipping companies can-
not take advantage of newly opened waters without new navi-
gation infrastructure, it makes little sense to decline public 
investment in the necessary infrastructure simply because it 
would be helping climate change winners. Rather, the prudent 
public investment policy would be to evaluate how helping the 
winners helps reduce the vulnerability of the losers. Nor would 
it make sense to erect barriers to private investment in benefit-
securing adaptations simply because it is about winners help-
ing themselves. A company that benefits through its climate 
proofing technological innovations is necessarily assisting the 
harm-reducing adaptations of others. A comprehensive adapta-
tion policy, therefore, would include significant attention to de-
fining climate change benefits and identifying opportunities to 
leverage public and private investments in benefit-securing ad-
aptations as opportunities to promote vulnerability-reducing 
adaptations.  
B. RESILIENCE-ENHANCING BENEFITS  
Not all the risks of climate change can be mitigated by re-
ducing vulnerability, as costs, technological constraints, lack of 
knowledge, and mistaken assumptions will limit vulnerability-
reducing capacity. The other strategy thus focuses on recover-
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ing from the blow of climate change by enhancing resilience to 
impacts, such as through improved emergency response tech-
niques and habitat restoration methods.198
Here again, investments in benefit-securing adaptations 
can help improve overall resilience to climate change. For ex-
ample, areas that prosper as a result of climate change can 
serve as refuges in times when other areas suffer catastrophic 
climate system events. Even in prospering areas, moreover, 
some adverse climate change effects will necessitate enhanced 
resilience capacity. Farmers in some regions, for example, may 
be balancing the benefits of more precipitation (e.g., reduced ir-
rigation costs) with the risks (e.g., increased flooding). That 
they may be net winners does not mean they face no exposure 
to losses.  
 
Winners everywhere will want to ensure their communities 
are resilient to climate change, and thus will support invest-
ments in resilience-enhancing adaptations. Supporting their 
benefit-securing adaptations thus helps them promote commu-
nity-wide resilience. A comprehensive adaptation policy, there-
fore, would include significant attention to defining climate 
change benefits and identifying opportunities to leverage public 
and private investments in benefit-securing adaptations as op-
portunities to promote overall resilience-enhancing adaptation 
policy. 
VI.  ENSURING WINNERS SECURE NO PROPERTY 
RIGHTS   
Mitigation and adaptation are distinct but related climate 
policy objectives—the more efficient and effective we are at one, 
the less pressure there is on the other, though it seems inevita-
ble we will need both. It is by no means inconsistent, therefore, 
to ignore climate change winners for purposes of mitigation pol-
icy and simultaneously embrace them for purposes of adapta-
tion policy. One danger that lurks in the second prong of this 
approach, however, arises if climate change winners begin to 
treat their benefits and the private and public investments in 
them as property rights subject to some level of protection. As 
one adaptation policy scholar has observed, “[t]he challenge will 
be in the balance between achieving essential adaptation out-
comes, respecting existing property rights, and avoiding the 
 
 198. See ENSOR & BERGER, supra note 197, at 17–25; Handmer & Dovers, 
supra note 195, at 190–204. 
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creation of compensable rights under future regulatory re-
gimes.”199
For example, although mitigation policy would ignore win-
ners for purposes of its design, as mitigation begins to gain 
traction on greenhouse gas concentrations current and prospec-
tive winners might argue that they are entitled to compensa-
tion for reduced streams of benefits. Similarly, as public adap-
tation investment policy adapts to evolving local and regional 
climate regimes, some infrastructure supported in the past 
might be abandoned or curtailed, the beneficiaries of which 
might seek compensation. Whether winners would have any le-
gal basis for compensation in the future is a question climate 
policymakers should anticipate now, as steps can be taken at 
the front end of climate change to ensure no property rights ac-
crue in the future benefits of climate change. Legal doctrine 
and institutions can begin to lay this groundwork by establish-
ing baselines for reasonable private expectations and by placing 
clear conditions on the benefits of public adaptation infrastruc-
ture.  
  
A. ESTABLISHING BASELINES FOR REASONABLE PRIVATE 
EXPECTATIONS 
Climate change winners are likely to make significant in-
vestments to secure and maintain their benefits. Passive win-
ners, for example, will invest in the added capital needed to 
continue working in longer growing and outdoor construction 
seasons. Adaptive winners will invest in the new capital needed 
to shift to different crops or production lines. Opportunistic 
winners most of all will lay out significant investments to seize 
on their stream of benefits. All of these winners’ investments 
will have been predicated on the anticipated effects of climate 
change. In other words, they are backing their investments—
they believe reasonably—on an expectation of climate change. 
It is obvious where this is leading: among other strategies, 
climate change winners will resist government-led efforts to 
deprive them of their secured benefits, whether through miti-
gation or adaptation, as unconstitutional takings of property 
without just compensation.200
 
 199. Jan McDonald, The Role of Law in Adapting to Climate Change, 2 
CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 287 (2011). 
 A central element in any such 
claim, however, is that the claimant demonstrates that the 
 200. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”). 
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government is interfering with “distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations.”201 Indeed, this “notion of investment-backed expec-
tations . . . is increasingly being regarded as a prime determi-
nant of what constitutes ‘property’ itself.”202
There are two core problems with any such claim. First, as 
explained above, climate change winners cannot expect their 
benefits to outlast climate change itself. If the government were 
to adopt no mitigation policies, letting climate change run una-
bated, many if not most climate change benefits enjoyed in a 
particular area will eventually fade away, swamped by the 
gradual amplification of offsetting harms. Climate change itself 
is thus the irrefutable rebuttal to reasonable investment-
backed expectations in climate change benefits.
 Climate change 
winners are sure to argue that their benefit-securing invest-
ments were based on reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions and thus should not be diminished through government 
mitigation and adaptation policies. 
203
But more to the point, climate change winners cannot 
claim reasonable investment-backed expectations when they 
know all along that the primary climate policy goal is to miti-
gate and adapt. As courts have explained, the “regulatory cli-
mate,” of which property owners are expected to be aware, can 
defeat claims of reasonable investment-backed expectations 
when those investments are clearly not consonant with the pol-
icy direction.
 
204 Climate change winners could hardly claim 
surprise in this sense when mitigation policies finally begin to 
gain traction on climate stabilization and alter the trajectory 
and distribution of climate change harms and benefits. Proper-
ty doctrines such as the public trust also could evolve so as to 
preclude takings claims relating to resources necessary to pub-
lic climate change adaptation.205
 
 201. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
  
 202. Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expecta-
tions,” 32 URB. LAW. 437, 437 (2000). 
 203. Several commentators have observed that this effect will defeat tak-
ings claims by coastal property owners. See J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and 
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Hence, rather than ignoring climate change benefits and 
their beneficiaries, climate policy should fully recognize their 
presence, allow private benefit-securing investments to flour-
ish, and loudly trumpet that mitigation and adaptation policies 
are designed to intervene in the profile of climate change harms 
and benefits across the landscape. The policy, in other words, is 
explicitly about changing who wins and who loses from climate 
change—the idea of course being to reduce the severity of 
harms. Thus, no person or business has a reasonable expecta-
tion of always maintaining benefits received or even of staying 
on a winner trajectory. Meanwhile, adaptation policy should 
feed into property doctrine to ensure it evolves in favor of de-
feating takings claims grounded in resources vital to protection 
of public trust resources and other resources associated with 
climate change adaptations needed to protect public health and 
critical environmental resources. The regulatory and judicial 
climate thus can directly engage climate change winners and 
make it abundantly clear that their private benefit-securing in-
vestments are taken on at their own risk. Legal scholars can 
supply much of the advanced theoretical and doctrinal design 
work supporting this approach. 
B. CONDITIONING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN BENEFITS 
As noted above, my suggested policy approach involves 
government pursuing aggressive mitigation policy alongside 
government investing in benefit-securing adaptations that re-
duce community-wide vulnerability and enhance community-
wide resilience. Just as many direct and indirect beneficiaries 
of public infrastructure investments challenge decisions to cur-
tail those benefits,206
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(2010). 
 when climate change winners see mitiga-
tion policy eroding the publicly provided infrastructure around 
which they have based their private lives, they may seek tak-
ings compensation. This potential, however, is easy to manage 
through clear legislative statements that all public investment 
in climate adaptation infrastructure, whether harm-reducing or 
benefit-securing, creates no rights, title, interest, or estate in or 
to the public infrastructure or its incidental benefits. The apt 
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analogy comes from permits and licenses the government is-
sues to private interests for use of and gain from public lands. 
The Taylor Grazing Act, for example, provides that issuance of 
grazing permits on public lands “shall not create any right, ti-
tle, interest, or estate in or to the [public] lands,”207 and the Su-
preme Court has held that the increment of value added to a 
private ranch by a public land grazing permit is not a compen-
sable private property interest.”208
Once again, therefore, it is important for climate policy 
now to fully recognize that there are climate change benefits 
and beneficiaries, including beneficiaries of public adaptation 
investments. From its very inception, climate policy should fo-
cus on building the case against the idea that climate change 
winners have any property right interests in benefits secured 
or maintained directly or indirectly by public investments in 
adaptation infrastructure. All legislation, regulations, and gov-
ernment contracting dealing with public climate change adap-
tation investments, therefore, should explicitly detail the core 
legal principle that public financial or other support of adapta-
tion projects creates no compensable property interests in the 
public infrastructure or its incidental private benefits. 
  
  CONCLUSION   
Talking about climate change winners makes me uncom-
fortable, but not nearly as uncomfortable as I become when I 
think what could happen if we do not talk about them. Millions 
of people and thousands of businesses and communities in the 
United States stand to reap benefits from climate change, and 
they will undoubtedly factor their beneficiary status into their 
positions on climate policy. Ignoring this substantial policy dy-
namic, which is only decades away from coming on line across 
the nation, cannot possibly be the prudent policy approach.  
Rather, we must study the benefits of climate change—their 
sources, their flows, their economic and social proportions, their 
life cycles, and their beneficiaries—every bit as intensely as we 
are attempting to do with respect to climate change harms. We 
must be ready to counter efforts that climate change winners 
might make to soften mitigation policies, but we should also be 
ready to make public investments, and facilitate private in-
vestments, in benefit-securing adaptations that promote overall 
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adaptation policy goals. Most of all, we should begin now to 
build the legal framework for rebutting any claims that climate 
change benefits, however secured, are protected property 
rights. Leaving all of this work for later, when the climate 
change winners are firmly entrenched throughout society, the 
economy, and politics, will only make the backlash against cli-
mate policy that is already more than evident all the more dif-
ficult to overcome. 
 
